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Whistling in Silence:
The Implications of Arbitration on
Qui Tam Claims
Under the False Claims Act
Mathew Andrews*
ABSTRACT

For nearly twenty years, corporate defendants have sought
unsuccessfully to use arbitration to roll back protections for whistleblowers
suing under federal law. The state and federal judiciaries have long stymied
these efforts, on the grounds that defendants cannot force the Government’s
claims into the secretive forum of arbitration. In January 2013, this
protection came to an end. A federal court ruled for the first time that a
whistleblower suing on behalf of the United States must pursue its action in
arbitration. Five months later, this trend continued as federal courts
This article
have compelled arbitration of state law qui tam actions.
argues that while the courts foundered in their reasoning, their holdings
were legally correct based on Supreme Court case law and a legislative
loophole in the Dodd-Frank Amendments of 2010.
As a result,
arbitration could fundamentally alter the way that whistleblower actions
are investigated and prosecuted, and may blunt what has been described
as the “government’s primary litigation tool for recovering losses
sustained as the result of fraud.”
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly two years ago, Justice Kagan dissented that “arbitration threatens
to become . . . a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of
meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability.”1 The
Justice’s words are concerning because it is the Supreme Court that has
pushed the boundaries of arbitrable disputes. Over the past two decades, the
Court has stretched the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to allow companies to
condition employment on workers signing arbitration clauses.2 As a result,
employees increasingly face a dilemma: either forfeit their right to a judicial
forum or lose their chance at employment.
Congress responded to this threat in 2010.3 As part of its landmark
legislation following the 2008 financial crisis, Congress overhauled the use
of pre-dispute arbitration by employers.4 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010
amended nearly all of the federal government’s whistleblower statutes to
prohibit companies from forcing whistleblowers into arbitration.5 Its antiarbitration provisions are meant to ensure that those who seek to uncover

* Associate, Morvillo Abramowitz, Grand, Iason, & Anello LLP; J.D., Yale Law School, 2014;
B.A., Yale University, 2011. I am particularly grateful to my friends and family for their feedback
and support. You have my greatest thanks. To the Dispute Resolution Law Journal staff—my
gratitude for your excellent edits and suggestions. All errors are my own.
1. Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013).
2. Judith Resnik, Renting Judges for Secret Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/01/opinion/renting-judges-for-secret-rulings.html?_r=0.
3. 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2) (2012) (prohibiting arbitration of whistleblower suits brought under
the Commodity Exchange Act); 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (granting the Consumer Protection Financial
Bureau authority to prohibit arbitration); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e) (prohibiting arbitration of
whistleblower suits brought under the Securities and Exchange Act); id. § 1514A(e)(2) (prohibiting
whistleblower suits brought under Sarbanes-Oxley from being arbitrated).
4. See supra note 3.
5. Id.
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wrongdoing do not “los[e] the court system as a means of publicizing their
claim[s],” and serve to protect both “investors” and the public.6
The legal literature has failed to notice that Congress left a debilitating
loophole in the nation’s whistleblower laws when it passed the Dodd-Frank
Act.7 In particular, Congress failed to add anti-arbitration provisions to the
Government’s “primary litigation tool for recovering losses sustained as the
result of fraud”: the False Claims Act (FCA).8
Through a unique legal mechanism called qui tam litigation, the FCA
authorizes individuals to bring civil suits on behalf of the federal
government.9 In return, these “relators” receive a share of the recovery.10
Since the FCA was amended in 1986, whistleblowers have brought nearly
ten thousand complaints under the act,11 recovering nearly $26 billion in
settlements and judgments.12 In 2012, a whistleblower helped the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) obtain the largest health care fraud settlement
in U.S. history.13

6. Bradley Mark Nerderman, Should Courts Apply Dodd-Frank’s Prohibition on the
Enforcement of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements Retroactively?, 98 IOWA L. REV. 2141, 2169
(2013).
7. To the extent that the legal literature acknowledges this situation, it merely comments that
Congress did not amend the False Claims Act. See Mark J. Oberti, New Wave of Employment
Retaliation and Whistleblowing, 38 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 99 (2012). The literature has not
considered whether qui tam claims are arbitrable as a result of this omission, how defendants would
go about compelling arbitration of such claims, and what the policy consequences of such arbitration
would be.
8. U.S. ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos., 520 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2008).
9. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
10. Id. § 3730(d).
11. Civil Div., Fraud Statistics, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 2 (Dec. 23, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf (using 2013 data).
12. Id.
13. Office of Pub. Affairs, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve
Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 2, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-civ-842.html.
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Congress’s failure to amend the FCA is understandable. For nearly
twenty years, defendants have sought to use arbitration to limit the
effectiveness of the statute.14 Nonetheless, the state and federal judiciaries
have long blocked their efforts. As the courts have reasoned, the
Government, not relators, owns the qui tam claims.15 Defendants, therefore,
could not compel the Government’s claim into arbitration because the
Government is not a signatory to relators’ arbitration contracts.16 Against
this background of judicial protection, it may have been unnecessary for
Congress to amend the FCA in 2010 to bar arbitration.
In January 2013, this protection came to an end.17 A federal court ruled
for the first time that a whistleblower suing on behalf of the United States
must pursue the action in arbitration.18 Five months later, another federal
court held similarly and compelled arbitration of a California state law qui
tam action.19 The district courts’ rationales were identical. Although a qui
tam action is necessarily “brought in the name of the Government,” the
action “still represents a claim belonging to the [p]laintiffs themselves.”20
Defendants can therefore force relators into arbitration on their qui tam
claims. These district courts are not alone in their reasoning. In July 2014,

14. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 612 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84 (D.D.C. 2009);
United States v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No. 99 C 8287, 2002 WL 31497338, at *1-3 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 7, 2002); Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Iskanian v. CLS
Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 361 (2014).
15. Morgan, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 84; Cancer Treatment Ctrs., 2002 WL 31497338, at *1-3;
Mikes, 889 F. Supp. at 755; Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 361; Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin a Cat:
Qui Tam Actions as a State Legislative Response to Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203,
1234 (2013).
16. See supra note 15.
17. Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31,
2013).
18. Deck, 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7.
19. Cunningham v. Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc., 2013 WL 3233211, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. June 25,
2013).
20. Deck, 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7; see Cunningham, 2013 WL 3233211, at *7-8.
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the California Supreme Court acknowledged that plaintiffs may be
contractually obligated to arbitrate state law qui tam actions,21 and several
federal courts have required plaintiffs to do so.22
This article is the first to address this shift toward qui tam arbitration. It
is also the first to demonstrate that qui tam claims are arbitrable under
prevailing Supreme Court precedent. By failing to include anti-arbitration
provisions in the FCA, Congress set the groundwork for corporate
defendants to oust whistleblower suits from court, and employers are
obliging. Corporations have begun to prevail in federal court and are
creating precedent in favor of qui tam arbitration. Employers are amending
their boilerplate arbitration clauses to include language covering “private
attorney general” actions23—another name for qui tam actions.24 As the
number of qui tam suits in federal courts continues to grow, defendants will
have every incentive to push for the cheaper, faster, and quieter avenue of
arbitration. As a result, corporate defendants in the coming years can blunt
the Government’s primary weapon in the fight against fraud, and tip the
scales in defendants’ favor.
The rest of this piece shows how defendants might go about compelling
qui tam claims into arbitration, and demonstrates the public policy
consequences of their doing so. The article proceeds in six parts. Part II
provides background on the False Claims Act and the Federal Arbitration
Act, and describes how an individual dispute involving qui tam arbitration
might arise.
21. See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 391 (2014) (“The arbitration
agreement gives us no basis to assume that the parties would prefer to resolve a [qui tam] claim
through arbitration . . . . The parties have not addressed these questions and may do so on remand.”).
22. Zenelaj v. Handybook Inc., No. 14-CV-05449-TEH, 2015 WL 971320, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 3, 2015); Martinez v. Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc., No. 8:14-CV-01481-CAS, 2014 WL 5604974, at
*5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014).
23. Scott v. TitleMax of S.C. Inc., 2012 WL 393365 (D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2012); Magee v.
Advance Am. Servicing of Arkansas, Inc., 2009 WL 890991 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 1, 2009).
24. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir.
2009).
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Part III analyzes why lower courts have split on whether qui tam claims
are arbitrable, and demonstrates that courts have disagreed on whether
relators “own” the qui tam claims. As the argument goes, if the Government
(and not the relator) owns the claim, then a relator cannot sign a contract
binding the Government’s claim into arbitration. As a result, qui tam claims
would not be arbitrable.
Part IV argues that lower courts on both sides of the debate have erred
in reasoning about whether relators “own” the claims. Lower courts have
failed to reach a principled answer because they have ignored the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on how relators bring their claims. By utilizing the
Court’s standing jurisprudence, Part IV makes a unique argument for why
qui tam claims are arbitrable based on relators’ status as “partial assignees”
under the FCA.
Part V then shows that if relators “own” the qui tam claims, principles
of contractual interpretation would mandate arbitration. Because arbitration
is a matter of contract, a court cannot compel arbitration of a dispute that the
parties have not agreed to arbitrate. While the circuits use three different
standards to determine whether parties have agreed to arbitrate a particular
type of claim, Part V shows that with a bit of clever defense lawyering, qui
tam suits would be arbitrable under each standard.
Part VI demonstrates the significant and detrimental policy implications
of qui tam arbitration. Given the complexity of qui tam claims,25 relators
must cooperate extensively with the Government26 and have full access to
discovery in order to prosecute their qui tam actions.27 Arbitration conflicts

25. Donald H. Caldwell, Jr., Qui Tam Actions: Best Practices for Relator’s Counsel, 38 J.
HEALTH L. 367, 374 (2005).
26. U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d
1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting S. REP. NO. 345, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5271).
27. See Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992); Michael Loucks, Impacts
of the Affordable Care Act and Anti-Kickback Legislation on Health Care Industry Clients,
ASPATORE, June 2013, at 1, 10, available at 2013 WL 3772666.
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with both of these endeavors. Because this conflict is likely not “inherent”
under Supreme Court case law, corporate defendants can blunt the
effectiveness of the FCA without losing their ability to arbitrate. Congress,
therefore, left a significant loophole in the nation’s whistleblower laws by
failing to amend the FCA to include anti-arbitration provisions.
Part VII concludes by examining the broader policy consequences of qui
tam arbitration. Qui tam arbitration could tip the balance in defendants’
favors by doing more than limiting relators’ rights. Qui tam arbitration
could also limit the Government’s right to a judicial forum. Should the DOJ
intervene into a relator’s action, defendants might be able to compel the
agency into arbitration as well. Likewise, if the DOJ intervenes after an
adverse judgment in arbitration, the agency could be barred from relitigating
the claims or issues. In short, qui tam arbitration could do what no arbitrable
claim has done before—limit the Government’s right to prosecute actions
based on an arbitration clause signed only by private individuals.28

28. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002) (declining to decide whether
an adverse judgment against an individual bringing a claim under the ADEA would bar an executive
agency from bringing a claim for the same conduct under the act).
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT
The FCA was originally enacted during the Civil War to deter fraud by
defense contractors.29 Nonetheless, the statute was relatively toothless until
Congress amended it in 1986.30 Pursuant to the amendments, the FCA
imposes civil liability upon “[a]ny person” who “knowingly presents, or
causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval.”31 Further, the FCA mandates treble damages and a civil penalty
of up to ten thousand dollars per claim.32
The FCA’s qui tam procedure begins when a private person, the relator,
brings a civil action “for the person and for the United States Government”
against the alleged false claimant.33 To initiate the action, the relator
delivers a copy of the complaint and any supporting evidence to the
Government,34 which then has sixty days to intervene35 and assume primary
responsibility for prosecution.36 If the Government declines to intervene
within that sixty-day period, the relator has the exclusive right to conduct the
action,37 and the Government may subsequently intervene only on a showing

29. Michael J. Davidson, Applying the False Claims Act to Commercial IT Procurements, 34
PUB. CONT. L.J. 25, 26 (2004).
30. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Holder, 673 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The 1986
Amendments expanded the FCA’s scope, increased the penalties, lowered the requisite standard of
knowledge and intent, revised the process for a qui tam relator to file suit, and expanded the number
of qui tam relators permitted to sue.”).
31. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012).
32. Id.
33. Id. § 3730(b)(1).
34. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
35. Id. § 3730(b)(2), (4).
36. Id. § 3730(c)(1).
37. Id. § 3730(b)(4).
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of “good cause.”38 Regardless of the DOJ’s intervention decision, the relator
is entitled to a court hearing should the DOJ attempt to dismiss the suit,39
and to a court determination of reasonableness prior to the DOJ’s settlement
of the claim.40
The relator will receive a share of any proceeds from the action. By
statute, this share ranges from fifteen to twenty-five percent if the
Government intervenes, and from twenty-five to thirty percent if the
government does not—plus attorney’s fees and costs.41 It is ultimately the
court’s responsibility to determine what is reasonable.42
Like the False Claims Act, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has a long
history. The FAA was originally enacted in 1925 and then reenacted and
codified in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States Code.43 Its purpose was to
oppose longstanding judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements and to
give such agreements the same legal footing as other contracts.44 The FAA
provides for stays of proceedings in federal district courts when an issue in
the proceeding is referable to arbitration.45 The statute further allows for
orders compelling arbitration when one party has failed, neglected, or
refused to comply with an arbitration agreement.46 As the Supreme Court
has held, these provisions to manifest a “liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements.”47

38. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
39. Dismissal prevents a relator from carrying out the action on his or her own and is distinct
from declining to intervene. While there is judicial review of the former decision, there is none for
the latter. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A)-(B), (c)(3).
40. Id. § 3730(c)(2).
41. Id. § 3730(d)(1)-(2).
42. See U.S. ex rel. Shea v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84 (D.D.C. 2011).
43. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
44. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-220 (1985).
45. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
46. Id. § 4.
47. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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Based on these statutes, a typical dispute raising qui tam arbitration
could proceed as follows. Prior to hiring an individual, a company would
require that the person sign an employment agreement with a boilerplate
arbitration clause. Ordinarily, such clauses state that the employee and the
company agree to arbitrate “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or
relating to this [employment] Agreement or the breach thereof.”48 These
clauses are typically non-negotiable.49
Sometime later, the company would enter into a separate contract with
the Government for the provision of some type of good or service. In the
course of that contract, the company would fraudulently bill the
Government. The frauds could include any range of activities, from
charging the Government for meals not actually served to troops in Iraq50 to
requesting Medicare compensation for non-existent medical procedures.51
After an employee witnesses the alleged fraudulent activity, she would file a
claim under seal with the DOJ. The DOJ would then decide whether to
intervene. Should the DOJ decline, the relator would bring the action on her
own in court. Should the DOJ intervene, the agency and the relator would
bring the claims jointly in a judicial forum. In either case, the defendant
would receive judicial notice of the allegations following the Government’s
intervention decision. The defendant would then seek to compel the relator
into arbitration based on the clause in whistleblower’s employment
agreement—and spark the litigation that is the subject of the rest of this
article.

48. See, e.g., Orcutt v. Kettering Radiologists, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (S.D. Ohio
2002).
49. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 121 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
50. U.S. ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., Civ. Action No. 05-00828 (HHK), 2007 WL
1954441 (D.D.C. July 5, 2007).
51. Orcutt, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
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III. THE LOWER COURTS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER QUI TAM SUITS ARE
ARBITRABLE BASED ON WHETHER RELATORS “OWN” THEIR CLAIMS
The solidly entrenched, though little discussed, judicial principle that
qui tam actions cannot be arbitrated is now in doubt. The principle
originated nearly twenty years ago in Mikes v. Strauss, where a federal
district court for the first time rejected qui tam arbitration.52 As the court
held, a relator “stands as a private representative of the [G]overnment” in her
qui tam actions.53 Thus, the Government, and not the relator, owns the
claim, because the whistleblower participates only in the “recovery to which
the [G]overnment may be entitled.”54 The court therefore was “not
convinced that [the] plaintiff, suing on the government’s behalf, [was]
necessarily bound by [the arbitration clause’s] terms,” given that the
“[G]overnment was not a party” to the relator’s employment agreement.55
During the next two decades, federal courts adopted the Mikes
“ownership” rationale in both holdings56 and dicta.57 As the courts have
held, qui tam disputes cannot be arbitrated because the dispute is not
52. Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 755 (1995);
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Morgan v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 612 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84 (D.D.C. 2009) (a
relator’s qui tam action cannot “be subject to arbitration inasmuch as an FCA relator stands in the
shoes of the United States and the United States has not agreed to arbitrate FCA claims”); United
States v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 2002 WL 31497338, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2002)
(holding that qui tam suit could not be arbitrated because it was not a dispute “between the parties”
to the arbitration contract, because the relator brings suit “on behalf of the United States”).
57. U.S. ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 2007 WL 1954441, at *5 (D.D.C. July 5, 2007)
(citing Mikes, 899 F. Supp. at 756-57); Orcutt v. Kettering Radiologists, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 746,
756 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (citing same); see U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525
F.3d 370, 381 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing McBride, 2007 WL 1954441, at *4–5; Orcutt, 199 F. Supp. 2d
at 754-56; Mikes, 889 F. Supp. at 755-57); U.S. ex rel. Cassaday v. KBR, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 850,
858 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (citing same); U.S. ex rel. Godfrey, No. 1:05cv1418, at 17-18 (E.D. Va. Nov.
13, 2007) (citing same).
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between relators and corporate defendants, but between the Government and
those that have allegedly defrauded it.58 Thus, a relator cannot waive the
Government’s right to proceed in court.
The secondary literature has joined the courts in arguing that qui tam
claims are not arbitrable.59 As Professor Janet Alexander has recently
argued, qui tam actions cannot be compelled to arbitration because such
suits “do not involve claims belonging to private individuals at all.”60
Instead, the claims belong to the Government.61 Because the FCA provides
the relator only a “financial stake in the recovery” and a “right of action,” a
relator cannot be forced to bring the state’s claim in arbitration.62 As a
result, Professor Alexander proposes that states cabin employers’ use of
arbitration clauses by passing qui tam statutes like the California Private
Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”).63
Despite the recent scholarly attention and nearly two decades of judicial
precedent, the legal literature has overlooked a significant development. In
2013, federal courts began to curtail their protection of qui tam suits. The
case, Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., was not much different than any
other qui tam suit.64 Several relators brought a qui tam action against a
private college for making allegedly false certifications to the federal

58. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
59. E.g., Sean Estes, Can You Be Forced to Arbitrate Your FCA Claims?, JAMES HOYER (June
13, 2014), http://www.jameshoyer.com/can-you-be-forced-to-arbitrate-your-fca-claims/ (“[Y]our
underlying FCA fraud case will certainly go to court because that claim belongs to the government
and is therefore beyond the scope of any employment agreement you might sign.”).
60. See Alexander, supra note 15, at 1228; id. at 1224-25 (“The relator does not sue to recover
group members’ individual claims for compensatory damages. Rather, a qui tam suit seeks to
recover on the state’s own claim, measured by the number of violations, and payable to the state.”).
61. Id. at 1228.
62. Id. at 1234.
63. Id. at 1234-35.
64. Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31,
2013).
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government.65 The defendant subsequently sought to compel arbitration
based on the relators’ contracts with the college.66 The Southern District of
Ohio nonetheless became the first court to compel arbitration of a qui tam
claim.67 The court cited no precedent for its holding. Instead, it relied solely
on the FCA’s text. As the court found, the statute states that qui tam actions
are “for the person and for the United States Government” (emphasis
added).68 The court, therefore, interpreted this to mean that even though a
qui tam suit is “‘brought in the name of the Government,’ it still represents a
claim belonging to the [p]laintiffs themselves.”69 As a result, the relator was
bound to arbitrate.
The reasoning in Deck was incomplete. The court pointed to no case
law for the holding that relators own their claims. Likewise, the court
neither indicated whether arbitration would be binding on the relator,70 nor
whether the Government would be barred by precluded from relitigating
claims or issues. In short, the Deck opinion raised more questions than it
answered.
Five months later, the federal district court for the Central District of
California similarly compelled arbitration of a qui tam action in
Cunningham v. Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc.71 The decision did not cite Deck. In
this case, the plaintiff brought its claim under Professor Alexander’s

65. Id
66. Id
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012)).
69. Id.
70. The court stated that “[a]fter arbitration on all claims, the parties shall either request that
the Attorney General consent to the resolution of the FCA claims . . . or resume litigation on the
FCA claims in this Court.” Id. at *8. This holding does not clarify whether the court would review
the FCA claims de novo or under the FAA’s “extremely deferential standard.” Dluhos v. Strasberg,
321 F.3d 365, 370 (3d Cir. 2003).
71. Cunningham v. Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc., No. CV 13-2122 CAS (CWx), 2013 WL 3233211,
at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013).
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aforementioned, “unarbitrable” California PAGA.72 In compelling the
PAGA claim into arbitration, the district court noted that PAGA suits “are,
in essence, a form of qui tam action.”73 As with qui tam suits, a PAGA
plaintiff pursues civil penalties “on behalf of the government” and receives a
twenty-five percent portion of any settlement or judgment.74 As a result, a
PAGA plaintiff “seeks to vindicate her own right to a substantial portion of
an award of civil penalties, not the rights of other[s].”75 Accordingly, the
court concluded that this “individual” claim “against the Company” was
subject to the arbitration clause.76
The federal judiciary has not been alone in its holdings. Most recently,
the California Supreme Court in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los
Angeles acknowledged that qui tam claims brought under PAGA could be
subject to arbitration.77 The acknowledgment arose in the context of another
issue: whether California can ban arbitration clauses requiring employees to
waive their right to bring PAGA claims in any forum, including arbitration.78
In upholding the California statute, the Court ruled that PAGA “lies outside
the FAA’s coverage” and is therefore not preempted.79 As the Court
reasoned, a qui tam claim is “not a dispute between an employer and an
employee.”80 Instead, it “is a dispute between an employer and the state.”81
As such, “qui tam plaintiffs” cannot waive the state’s right to bring its
claim.82

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 392 (2014).
Id. at 360.
Id. at 386.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 387.
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Despite this holding, the Supreme Court left open the possibility that the
parties could arbitrate the claims. As the Court found, the specific
“arbitration agreement gives [the Court] no basis to assume that the parties
would prefer to resolve a representative PAGA claim through arbitration.”83
The Court, therefore, remanded the case so that the parties could address
whether to arbitrate the claim.84 In the months that followed, several federal
courts have followed the California Supreme Court’s lead and have
compelled arbitration of these state law qui tam claims.85
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, state and federal courts have split
as to whether qui tam suits are arbitrable. Yet these decisions suffer from a
similar flaw. In coming to opposite conclusions as to who “owns” the qui
tam claim (or “dispute”86), courts both for and against qui tam arbitration
have conspicuously failed to ground their analysis in Supreme Court
precedent. As a result, lower courts have failed to come to a principled
answer as to whether qui tam claims are arbitrable.
The California Supreme Court’s decision in Iskanian exemplifies the
problem. While the majority purported to leave open the issue of whether
qui tam claims are arbitrable, Justice Chin concurred on the grounds that the
majority actually foreclosed such an outcome. As Justice Chin argued, the
Court’s holding that qui tam claims “are not disputes between employers and
employees” not only is a “novel theory, devoid of case law support,” but
also would permit California to “ban arbitration of [qui tam] claims.”87 The
concurrence thus called for the Court to “limit [itself] to an analysis firmly

83. Id. at 391.
84. Id.
85. Zenelaj v. Handybook Inc., No. 14-CV-05449-TEH, 2015 WL 971320, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 3, 2015); Martinez v. Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc., No. 8:14-CV-01481-CAS, 2014 WL 5604974, at
*5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2014).
86. The term “claim” and “dispute” are synonymous. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 472
(6th ed. 1990) (“dispute: conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims of rights; an assertion of a right
claim or demand on one side, met by contrary claims or allegations on the other”).
87. Iskanian, 59 Cal. 4th at 396 (Chin, J. concurring).
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grounded in high court precedent, rather than needlessly adopt a novel
theory that renders the FAA completely inapplicable.”88 Unfortunately, the
concurrence failed to fill in that analysis.89
This shortcoming is not inevitable. This article is the first to provide an
analysis, firmly grounded in high court precedent, for why qui tam claims
are arbitrable. As the next section of this article demonstrates, under current
Supreme Court case law, employers can compel relators to arbitrate the qui
tam claims, because those claims belong to relators as “partial assignees”
under the FCA.
IV. DEFENDANTS CAN COMPEL QUI TAM CLAIMS INTO ARBITRATION
BECAUSE RELATORS OWN THE CLAIMS
Despite their inconsistency, lower court decisions regarding the
arbitrability of qui tam claims have agreed on one point. If a relator owns
the qui tam claim, she can be compelled into arbitration. If the Government
owns the claim, she cannot.
Nonetheless, decisions on both sides of the issue—as well as the
litigants’ briefs—have failed to cite any Supreme Court jurisprudence to
88. Id.
89. The concurrence argues that qui tam plaintiffs have a “statutory right” to their claim. Id. at
395. Further, under Supreme Court case law, a provision in an arbitration agreement may not
“forbid[] the assertion of certain statutory rights.” Id. (citing Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,
133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013)). Thus, the concurrence concludes that PAGA waivers are
unenforceable because they deny qui tam plaintiffs their statutory rights. Id. at 396-97. The
concurrence, however, does not explain why—under Supreme Court case law—qui tam plaintiffs
have a statutory right to their claim. If a PAGA plaintiff is, as the majority and concurrence say, an
“agent or proxy of the state,” id. at 394, then they would have no statutory rights of their own. See
Willcox & Gibbs Sewing-Mach. Co. v. Ewing, 141 U.S. 627, 637 (1891) (“[T]he principal has a
right to determine or revoke the authority given to his agent at his own mere pleasure; for, since the
authority is conferred by his mere will, and is to be executed for his own benefit and his own
purposes, the agent cannot insist upon acting when the principal has withdrawn his confidence, and
no longer desires his aid.”). This article fills in the conceptual gap by arguing that qui tam plaintiffs
have a “statutory right” as partial assignees rather than agents of the state.
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support their positions on who owns a qui tam claim. This Part fills that
interpretive gap by looking to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
relators’ standing. It is impossible to understand whether a relator owns her
claim without knowing how she brings a claim: in other words, how a
relator has standing.
By tracing the Supreme Court’s standing
jurisprudence, this Part demonstrates that relators own their claims as
“partial assignees”—and therefore can be compelled into arbitration.
A. The Supreme Court’s Decisions on Standing Demonstrate that Relators
Own Their Claims as Partial Assignees under the FCA
The issue of relators’ standing goes back to the 1986 amendments to the
FCA, which left federal courts with a constitutional problem. Article III
limits the judicial power of the United States to the resolution of cases and
controversies.90 In turn, courts use the doctrine of standing to determine
whether such a case or controversy exists.91 Standing requires several
elements, of which one is critically important.92 The plaintiff must suffer an
injury herself.93
Relators, therefore, faced a constitutional dilemma. While Congress
authorized them to bring civil actions, the relators themselves had suffered
no injury—and therefore needed a theory to support their standing.
The Supreme Court put to rest the debate on how relators have Article
III standing nearly fourteen years ago in Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens.94 The Court rejected the
widespread assumption, offered by appellate courts and litigants, that
relators serve as agents of the federal government,95 holding that such an
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979).
Id. at 100.
Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772 (2000).
Id.
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agency “analysis is precluded . . . by the fact that the statute gives the relator
himself an interest in the lawsuit, and not merely the right to retain a fee out
of the recovery.”96 This interest included the right to bring the suit “for the
person and for the United States Government, . . . the right to continue as a
party to the action,” even when the Government has intervened, “the right to
a hearing before the Government’s voluntary dismissal of the suit . . . and
the right to a judicial determination of ‘fairness, adequacy and
reasonableness’” prior to the government settling the suit.97
The Court found an answer to the question of the relators’ standing in
the doctrine of partial assignment.98 As the Court concluded, “The FCA can
reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the
Government’s damages claim.”99 Unlike a contract, which creates a legal
right, an assignment transfers a legal right.100 Accordingly, a partial
assignment is a partial transfer of a right.101 When the Government transfers
part of its “damages claim,” the relator gains a form of “representational
standing.”102
This landmark holding consisted of four sentences and a footnote and
provided no further explanation of how the FCA makes a “partial
assignment” or what the implications of such an assignment might be.103 As
a result, the legal literature has puzzled over the decision for over a
decade.104 Given the Stevens decision’s brevity, it is unsurprising that
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 773.
100. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 11.3, at 58 (2d ed. 1998).
101. 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 129 (2013).
102. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773.
103. Eric S. Askanase, Qui Tam and the False Claims Act: Criminal Punishment in Civil
Disguise the Qui Tam Provisions of the FCA Are a Serious Threat to American Industry, and They
Are Subject to Constitutional Challenges on Several Grounds, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 472, 478 (2003).
104. See Nathan D. Sturycz, The King and I?: An Examination of the Interest Qui Tam Relators
Represent and the Implications for Future False Claims Act Litigation, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
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litigants and lower courts have either avoided or ignored the opinion.
Neither federal courts nor the secondary literature on the topic of whether
qui tam claims are arbitrable mentions Stevens or even uses the term “partial
assignment.”105 While the California Supreme Court in Iskanian purports to
rely on Stevens for its conclusion that state law qui tam plaintiffs are
“agents” of the state, the Court fails to take any notice that Stevens actually
rejected a principal-agent relationship between relators and the
Government.106
The plain language of Stevens and two subsequent Supreme Court
decisions demonstrate that relators own their claims. Based on Stevens, the
FCA effects a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim.107
Such an assignment is different from a principal-agent relationship.108 A
partial assignment fractures the Government’s single and entire claim into
two, and transfers one of those pieces to the assignee.109 Following this
transfer, the claim becomes the relator’s property and is her “own” claim.110
As a result, the partial assignment becomes arbitrable.
The Supreme Court’s later decision in Sprint Communications Co., L.P.
v. APCC Services, Inc. confirms the interpretation that relators own their
REV. 459, 470 (2009) (“[E]ven after Stevens, the relator-government relationship was hardly
clear.”); Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. Ex Rel. Stevens and the Future of Public
Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315, 345 (2001).
105. See Alexander, supra note 15, at 1228.
106. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 381-82 (2014).
107. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773.
108. U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 540 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d sub
nom. U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 129 S. Ct. 2230, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1255
(2009).
109. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 156 (1932) (“An assignment of either a fractional
part of a single and entire right against an obligor . . . is operative . . . to the same extent and in the
same manner as if the part had been a separate right.”).
110. Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 289 (2008) (“There is an
important distinction between simply hiring a lawyer and assigning a claim to a lawyer (on the
lawyer’s promise to remit litigation proceeds). The latter confers a property right (which creditors
might attach); the former does not.”).
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claims. While Sprint was not itself about qui tam actions, the Court did
address when an assignee has Article III standing.111 The Court relied on
Stevens in holding that standing does not depend on what the plaintiff
“ultimately intends to do with the money he recovers.”112 Rather, standing
turns on whether the assignment transfers the assignee’s “injury in fact.”113
As the majority explained, under the FCA, relators have standing “because
the Act ‘effect[s] a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim’
and that assignment of the ‘United States’ injury in fact suffices to confer
standing on [the relator].’”114 Because that assignment also grants a property
right to the assignee, the “injury in fact” becomes the assignee’s property.115
In other words, when relators sue, they sue on their own injuries and their
own claims—not the Government’s.
The Sprint Court’s interpretation that the qui tam claim is a relator’s
property cannot be explained away as dicta. One year later, the Court
underscored its understanding that the FCA confers a claim upon relators in
U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York.116 There, the Court addressed
whether the Government is a “party” in declined qui tam actions.117 By
ruling that the Government is not a party for procedural purposes, the Court
acknowledged that the Government is “a real party in interest” in declined
actions.118 As the Court held, under a partial assignment, “the assignor and
the assignee each retain an interest in the claim and both are real parties in

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 272-73.
Id. at 286-87.
Id.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 289.
U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 934 (citing 6A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1545, at 351–53 (2d ed.1990)).
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interest.”119 Both entities are, therefore, actors with “substantive right[s]
whose interests may be represented in litigation by another.”120
Eisenstein is significant because the Court acknowledged that both
assignors and assignees are “real parties in interest” in partial assignments.121
By definition, a relator must own her claim to be a real party in interest.122
A real party in interest is someone who possesses a “substantive right.”123 A
relator would not have a “substantive right” if the FCA only granted
whistleblowers procedural rights and a stake in the recovery. A procedural
right is not substantive.124 Neither is the “portion of recovery,” because that
right does not “materialize until the litigation is completed and the relator
prevails.”125 A relator’s substantive right must come from somewhere
else—its piece of the FCA damages claim. Combined, the Court’s decisions
in Stevens, Sprint, and Eisenstein therefore point to one conclusion: a relator
owns the qui tam claim as a partial assignee of the Government’s injury and
claim, and this is evidenced by the fact that relators are real parties in
interest in qui tam suits.

119. Id.
120. Id. at 934-35. Nonetheless, because status as a “real party in interest” is not necessarily
synonymous with status as a “party,” the Court ruled that the Government was not a “party” in
declined actions. Id. at 937.
121. The Court refers to the Government four times as “a real party in interest.” Id. at 930,
934-35. The use of the indefinite article (“a real party in interest”) is important because it denotes
that there are two real parties in interest rather than one. See U.S. ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin
Eng’g & Sci. Servs. Co., 336 F.3d 346, 358 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Texas Tech Univ., 171
F.3d 279, 295 (5th Cir. 1999).
122. See 1 F. R. CIV. P., RULES AND COMMENTARY RULE 17.
123. Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 934-35.
124. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1437 (9th ed. 2009) (“procedural right: A right that derives
from legal or administrative procedure; a right that helps in the protection or enforcement of a
substantive right”); see id. at 1438 (“substantive right: A right that can be protected or enforced by
law; a right of substance rather than form”). A right to relief is a procedural right. Chapman v.
Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979).
125. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000).
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A. The Lower Courts’ Jurisprudence on Pre-Filing Releases Confirm that
Relators Can Contract Away Their Qui Tam Claims
The view that relators own the qui tam claims is consistent with how
courts have treated qui tam suits in other contexts. For nearly twenty years,
lower courts across ten circuits have held that relators can sell their qui tam
claims to third parties.126 These transactions, called “pre-filing releases,”
occur when a relator assigns her claim to a third party rather than filing a
complaint.127 These sales are rarely made to disinterested entities.
Ordinarily, a relator sells the action to the defendant for a substantial sum.128
Because a defendant will not bring suit against itself, the sale effectively
settles the relator’s claim.
Such settlements invalidate the theory that the Government owns the qui
tam claims.129 While only a handful of courts have cited Stevens, those that
have made the leap have recognized that relators own their claims. As the
courts have ruled, under Stevens, “Article III standing in qui tam cases is
founded in a statutory assignment of the government’s injury-in-fact to the

126. United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 600 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir. 2010);
United States ex rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 558 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2009);
United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., Inc., 575 F.3d 458, 474 (5th Cir. 2009);
United States ex rel. Gebert v. Transp. Admin. Servs., 260 F.3d 909, 916 (8th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 965 (9th Cir. 1995); U.S. ex rel. Powell v. Am.
InterContinental Univ., Inc., 2012 WL 2885356 (N.D. Ga. July 12, 2012); U.S. ex rel. McNulty v.
Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 2d 341, 361 (E.D. Mich. 2011); U.S. ex rel. Nowak v.
Medtronic, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 2d 310, 337 (D. Mass. 2011); U.S. ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power
Techs., Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d 815, 818 (S.D. Tex. 2007); U.S. ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington
Univ., 2007 WL 1302597 (D.D.C. May 2, 2007); see Brown v. City of S. Burlington, 393 F.3d 337,
338 (2d Cir. 2004) (analyzing a pre-filing release related to a qui tam action under contract law but
allowing the case to go to trial to determine whether the release had been obtained under duress).
127. A release is an assignment of a claim from the plaintiff to the defendant. See BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1315 (8th ed. 2004) (“release: the act of giving up a right or claim to the person
against whom it could have been enforced”).
128. Id.
129. See Gebert, 260 F.3d at 913.
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relator.”130 As such, a pre-filing release “divests the relator of the ability to
retain an injury-in-fact assignment from the United States” and renders the
“relator’s right to the claim (including any money damages) . . . the property
of the [recipient’s] estate.”131 The few other courts considering Stevens in
the context of pre-filing releases have come to the same conclusion—the
relator owns the claim.132 Indeed, pre-filing releases could not exist
otherwise; if the Government owned the qui tam claim, the relator would
have nothing to release.
B. Lower Court Decisions Rejecting Relator Ownership Have
Misinterpreted Supreme Court Precedent
Despite the Second and Ninth Circuits’ decisions enforcing pre-filing
releases,133 the two appellate courts have issued contradictory opinions on
who owns the qui tam claims. Both circuits have held that relators may not
sue pro se because they do not own the qui tam claims.134 These holdings
came in the course of interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which governs when
parties may proceed without legal counsel.135 Since the statute allows
parties suing without counsel to “plead and conduct their own cases,”136 a

130. Id. at 914.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. Purdue, 600 F.3d at 329 (“[O]nce the government suffered an injury (and [the relator]
became aware of the fraud causing the injury), [the relator] had a statutory claim, and the necessary
legal standing as partial assignee, to file a qui tam lawsuit.”); Ritchie, 558 F.3d at 1167 (“[The
relator] argues the FCA claims are not claims she ‘might have’ because they belong to the United
States. This argument is undercut by the language of the FCA and by Supreme Court precedent.”);
Longhi, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 823 (“Contrary to relator’s claim that the action does not belong to
relator, the Fifth Circuit has expressly held that relator is a party to the suit.”).
133. Northrop, 59 F.3d at 965; see Brown, 393 F.3d at 338.
134. U.S. ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2008); Stoner v. Santa
Clara Cnty. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012).
136. Mergent Servs., 540 F.3d at 92 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1654).
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relator suing pro se must demonstrate that she is “litigating an interest
personal to h[er].”137
Like the few courts in their pre-filing release jurisprudence, the Second
and Ninth Circuits have looked to Stevens to adjudicate the question of qui
tam claims ownership. The two circuits, however, have come to a different
outcome. Both have concluded that, while a relator is a partial assignee in a
qui tam suit, “the injury . . . belongs to the United States.”138 So while the
FCA partially assigns to relators certain “procedural guarantees” and a
portion of the recovery,139 “[t]he claim itself belongs to the United States.”140
As further evidence of this proposition, the courts have pointed to the text of
the FCA, which provides that “the Government may elect to pursue its claim
through any alternate remedy.”141 Because relators do not own their claims,
the courts have concluded that relators must also lack the personal interest
required to proceed pro se.142
As these decisions demonstrate, the Second and Ninth Circuits have
interpreted Stevens as distinguishing the assignment of a “claim” from the
assignment of a “damages claim.” While a partial assignment of the “claim”
grants a property right in the Government’s injury in fact, a partial
assignment of the “damages claim” grants procedural rights and a monetary
bounty. This reading, however, is attenuated. A “claim” is a right to
relief.143 Thus, a damages claim is a right to relief for damages. By stating
that the FCA partially assigns the “Government’s damages claim,” the
137. Id. (quoting Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998)).
138. Id. at 93 (citing Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774-75
(2000)); Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1127 (quoting Stevens, 529 U.S. at 771 (The relator “is suing to remedy
an injury in fact suffered by the United States.”)).
139. Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1127 (citing Stevens, 529 U.S. at 772)).
140. Mergent Servs., 540 F.3d at 93.
141. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5)); Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1126 (citing
same).
142. Mergent Servs., 540 F.3d at 93; Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1126.
143. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 282 (9th ed. 2009) (“claim: the part of a complaint in a civil
action specify what relief the plaintiff asks”).
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Supreme Court did not mean that the Act assigns a “portion of the proceeds”
and a “cause of action.” Rather, it meant that the FCA partially assigns the
Government’s legal claim to damages, rather than the Government’s
equitable claim for injunctive relief.144 Basic principles of assignment law
confirm this interpretation. While the Government can assign its proprietary
rights to private individuals, it cannot assign its sovereign rights.145 In turn,
non-pecuniary rights (e.g. injunctions) are sovereign rights.146 The court in
Stevens was therefore distinguishing proprietary rights from sovereign rights
when it used the phrase “damages claim,” not between claims and nonclaims.
The FCA’s statutory text is not contrary to Stevens. The lower courts in
their pro se jurisprudence are correct that the FCA states that “the
Government may elect to pursue its claim through any alternative
remedy.”147 Nonetheless, a partial assignment effectively fractures a single
and entire right into two.148 The text of the FCA therefore establishes that
the Government can pursue “its claim” through alternative remedies—not
that the Government owns the relator’s suit.
The Supreme Court’s later decisions in Sprint and Eisenstein
demonstrate this point. If the FCA both assigns the Government’s injury in
fact (Sprint) and turns the relator into a real party in interest (Eisenstein), the
relator must also own the claim.149 The Second and Ninth Circuit opinions
are therefore unsupported by either the text of Stevens or the Supreme
Court’s subsequent decisions on relators’ standing.
C. Because Relators Own Qui Tam Claims, Relators Can Also Be
144. Gilles, supra note 104, at 344 (“Under the traditional formulation of assignment . . . claims
seeking to vindicate the government’s non-proprietary, sovereign interests are not assignable.”).
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) (2012) (emphasis added).
148. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 156 (1932).
149. Supra Section III.A.

227

Published by by
Published
Pepperdine
Pepperdine
Digital Digital
Commons,
Commons,
2015
2015

25
25

Pepperdine
Dispute
Resolution Law
Vol.Vol.
15, Iss.
[2015],
Art. 1 Art. 1
Pepperdine
Dispute
Resolution
LawJournal,
Journal,
15,2 Iss.
2 [2015],

[Vol. 15: 203, 2015]

Whistling in Silence
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

Compelled into Arbitration
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Stevens, Sprint, and Eisenstein
establish that the FCA partially assigns both the Government’s injury and
claim to relators. A relator bringing a qui tam claim, therefore, does not sue
on the Government’s rights. Rather, the relator’s partial assignment
functions as if it “had been a separate right” from that of the Government.150
As a result, when a relator sues under the FCA, it is as if she sues on her
own injuries and her own claims.151 Under Supreme Court precedent, the
relator-partial assignee has a property right over the claim and can sell, or
otherwise limit her expression of that right, through contract.152 Given these
circumstances, it follows that a relator can agree to arbitrate her claim. After
all, arbitration is a form of contract.153
The fact that the Government is a “real party in interest” to the relator’s
qui tam suit does not change this outcome. There is no rule that prevents
arbitration when there are multiple real parties in interest.154 Instead, the
rule is that arbitrators may only adjudicate the claims of the parties to the

150. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 156 (1932).
151. See id.
152. Supra note 110 and accompanying text.
153. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).
154. See Sauer v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 668 F.3d 644, 650 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the
Department of Education could engage in arbitration even though real party in interest to the suit
was not included as a party); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 843, 849 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding that the real party in interest that had signed the arbitration agreement could be
compelled into arbitration, but that arbitrators could not bind a real party in interest that was a nonsignatory); Tuminello v. Richards, No. C11-5928BHS, 2012 WL 750305, at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. Mar.
8, 2012), aff’d, 504 F. App’x 557 (9th Cir. 2013) (ruling that plaintiff could proceed into arbitration
even though there were other unnamed, real parties in interest to the suit); Data-Stream AS/RS
Techs., LLC v. China Int’l Marine Containers, Ltd., No. 02 Civ. 6530 (JFK), 2003 WL 22519456
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2003) (ruling that assignor could proceed into arbitration even though assignee
was a real party in interest and not captioned in the suit); In re Chi-Chi’s, Inc., 338 B.R. 618, 627
(Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (finding that one real party in interest could pursue its claim in arbitration
even though the other real party in interest brought its claim in court).
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arbitration.155 Under lower court precedent, defendants can compel a
relator’s qui tam claim into arbitration, and arbitrators can dismiss the
relator’s action.156 Yet if the Government is not a party to the arbitration,
arbitrators cannot dismiss the Government’s claims.157
This standard makes sense. Arbitration is a creature of contract and
subject to the same limitations as other contractual agreements.158 As
previously noted, a relator can contract to sell her qui tam claim even though
the Government is a real party in interest.159 A relator cannot, however,
purport to sell the Government’s claim.160 By analogy, it follows that a
relator can arbitrate her qui tam claim despite the Government’s interest in
the suit. Given the Supreme Court’s admonition that the FAA “places
arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts,”161 it would
be contradictory to hold that the Government’s status permits relators to sell
their claims (to the very defendant’s that are alleged to have committed
fraud) but bars relators from arbitrating them.162
Finally, the understanding that relators “own” their qui tam claims does
not conflict with the maxim that relators sue “on behalf of” the
Government.”163 The text of the FCA does not use the language “on behalf
of.” Rather, the FCA states that a relator “bring[s] a[n] action . . . for the
person and for the United States.”164 A relator suing on its own claim does
precisely that. When a relator brings an action, both the person and the

155. Nationwide, 330 F.3d at 848-49.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 67.
159. Supra Section III.B.
160. Id.
161. Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 67.
162. To the extent that there are unique public policy reasons for rejecting arbitration, those
reasons are confined to the circumstances addressed in Part VI of this article.
163. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 787.
164. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012).
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United States become real parties in interest to the suit.165 A relator then
sues “on behalf of” the Government because she remedies an injury that is
identical to one suffered by the state—not because the relator legally serves
as the Government’s “representative” in the qui tam action.166
In sum, the understanding that relators own their claims is consistent
with Supreme Court jurisprudence and the broader field of qui tam law. As
the next part of this article demonstrates, before defendants can compel qui
tam claims into arbitration, they must also prove that relators have agreed to
arbitrate their claims by signing arbitration clauses. While the circuits use
three different tests to determine whether this is the case, relators’ claims
likely fall within the contractual scope of their arbitration clauses under each
test.
V. QUI TAM CLAIMS FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF RELATORS’ ARBITRATION
CLAUSES AS A MATTER OF CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION
Corporate defendants must do more than demonstrate that relators own
the qui tam claims in order to compel arbitration. They must also show that
the qui tam claims fall within the scope of relators’ arbitration clauses.
Because arbitration is a matter of contract, a court cannot compel arbitration

165. See U.S. ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng’g & Sci. Servs. Co., 336 F.3d 346, 358 (5th
Cir. 2003); U.S. ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 883-84, supplemented,
173 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (interpreting the phrase “for the person and for the United States” to
mean that relators and the government are real parties in interest); United States v. Texas Tech
Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 289-90 (5th Cir. 1999).
166. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 298 (2002) (holding that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) could bring a claim “on behalf of” a private
employee even though the agency did not act in any representative capacity). Furthermore, the
FCA’s requirement that a relator bring the claim “in the name of the Government” is immaterial. 31
U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). The question of in whose name an action must be brought is procedural, not
substantive. 6A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1544 (3d ed. 1988). Thus, the naming requirement has
no bearing on whether a relator has a substantive right (e.g., an injury and a claim).

230

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss2/1
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol15/iss2/1

28
28

Andrews:
Whistling
in Silence:The
The Implications
Implications of Arbitration
on Quion
Tam
Andrews:
Whistling
in Silence:
of Arbitration
Qui Tam

[Vol. 15: 203, 2015]

Whistling in Silence
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

of a dispute that the parties have not agreed to arbitrate.167 It is up to the
courts to determine in the first instance whether an arbitration clause covers
a particular claim.168 This part shows that qui tam claims fall within the
scope of standard arbitration clauses.
As an initial matter, defendants are already taking a simple measure to
ensure that arbitration clauses cover FCA claims; namely, including qui tam
suits in the list of disputes covered by the arbitration clause.169 Boilerplate
arbitration agreements now include language covering “private attorney
general” actions:170 another name for qui tam actions.171 Under such
circumstances, courts cannot avoid compelling a relator’s qui tam claim into
arbitration. As the Supreme Court has held, “Absent some ambiguity in the
agreement . . . it is the language of the contract that defines the scope of
disputes subject to arbitration.”172 Explicitly specifying “private attorney
general” or “qui tam” claims removes any such ambiguity.
Given that arbitration clauses have retroactive effect,173 defendants in
the coming years can easily amend their employees’ contracts to include the
new terms. Of course, whistleblowers with pending qui tam claims would
likely object. But if forced to choose between a judicial forum and
continued employment, relators might very well sign the new contracts.174

167. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
168. AT&T Techs, Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 651 (1986).
169. Scott v. TitleMax of S.C. Inc., Civ. Action No. 3:09-1032-CMC-JRM, 2012 WL 393365
(D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2012); Magee v. Advance Am. Servicing of Ark., Inc., No. 608-cv-6105, 2009 WL
890991 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 1, 2009).
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Branch Consultants v. Allstate Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir.
2009).
172. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002).
173. Levin v. Alms & Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 2011).
174. Firing the relator for not signing the new agreement would likely not give rise to a
colorable retaliation claim. Buboltz v. Residential Advantages, Inc., 523 F.3d 864, 869 (8th Cir.
2008), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011)
(rejecting claim of retaliation because policy change “required all employees to work every other
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As the rest of this part demonstrates, even if corporate defendants do not
uniformly adopt the naming or retroactive application strategy, qui tam
claims would still fall within the language of standard arbitration clauses. A
relator’s arbitration clause generally says that the parties agree to arbitrate
“[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this [employment]
Agreement or the breach thereof.”175 As the appellate courts have
recognized, this language “is the paradigm of a broad clause.”176 Thus,
courts have limited discretion to deny arbitration because all doubts must be
resolved in favor of arbitrability.177 As a result, relators face an uphill battle
in proving their qui tam suits do not “relate to” their employment
agreements and, therefore, fall outside the scope of relators’ arbitration
clauses.
Presently, only a handful of courts have gotten far enough in their
analysis to determine whether qui tam claims “relate to” relators’ arbitration
clauses.178 Those that have addressed the issue have split into two lines of
thought. As one line of decisions has held, qui tam claims “in no way”
relate to a relator’s “employee status,” because even if the relator “had never
been employed by defendants, assuming other conditions were met, the
relator would still be able to bring a suit against them for presenting false
claims to the government.”179 In other words, relators’ qui tam claims fall
outside of the scope of their contracts because under a set of hypothetical
facts, relators could still file their claims.

weekend”); Uddin v. City of New York, 427 F. Supp. 2d 414, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding no
adverse action where all employees were subjected to the same change in company policy).
175. E.g., Orcutt v. Kettering Radiologists, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Collins & Aikman Prod. Co. v. Bldg. Sys., Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1995).
177. AT&T, 475 U.S. at 650.
178. Mikes v. Strauss, 889 F. Supp. 746, 754 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus.
Coll. Co., 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2013); Cunningham v. Leslie’s Poolmart,
Inc., 2013 WL 3233211, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013).
179. Mikes, 889 F. Supp. at 754.
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In contrast, the district courts in favor of qui tam arbitration have
focused on the fact that qui tam claims (and their PAGA equivalents)
“belong[] to the [p]laintiffs themselves.”180 As the courts reasoned, qui tam
claims are “nothing more” than “claim[s] that [the plaintiffs] may have
against the Company” and “should be compelled” into arbitration.181
Neither of these explanations is persuasive because they ignore that
circuit courts have very specific tests for determining the scope of arbitration
clauses.
Indeed, the aforementioned decisions concerning qui tam
arbitration fail to cite a single appellate decision for their conclusions.
Presently, the courts of appeals utilize at least three different formulae for
determining when a claim “relates to” an employment agreement.182 Under
each of the configurations, qui tam claims would be arbitrable.
A. Qui Tam Claims Require Relators to Make Factual Allegations Relating
To Their Employment Contracts
The majority of circuit courts use a similar test to determine when a
dispute “relates to” the parties’ employment contract. A dispute falls within
the parties’ arbitration agreement if the factual allegations underlying the
claim “touch matters in”183 or “significantly relate to”184 the employment
contract. Circuits employing the factual allegations standard look to the
facts actually pled in the complaint and whether those facts reference the
180. Deck, 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7; see Cunningham, 2013 WL 3233211, at *7-8.
181. Cunningham, 2013 WL 3233211, at *11.
182. Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 1351, 1366-69 (11th
Cir. 2008).
183. 3M Co. v. Amtex Sec., Inc., 542 F.3d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 2008); Genesco, Inc. v. T.
Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987).
184. Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 721 (9th Cir. 1999); Am. Recovery Corp. v.
Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 93 (4th Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit’s
standard is also synonymous with the “significant relationship” test. Gore v. Alltel Commc’ns, LLC,
666 F.3d 1027, 1033 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kiefer Specialty Flooring, Inc. v. Tarkett, Inc., 174
F.3d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1999)).
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plaintiff’s employment agreement.185 Under these circumstances, it is
unlikely that relators could avoid arbitration.
To begin, relators must provide significant information about their
employment status in order to plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The reason is that a relator’s insider
status significantly enhances the reliability of her accusations.186 Courts
have thus required relators to “give[] precise and credible information on
how [they] know[] what [they] allege,”187 including where they were
employed, how long they had worked there, the scope of their professional
duties, whether they had company-wide access to files, whom they
supervised, and who supervised them.188 In this respect, the inquiry in a qui
tam suit is much like that in a trade secret dispute, where courts examine
how the parties “gained access to the . . . information” claimed to be
confidential.189 Under such circumstances, the courts have held that disputes
fall within the scope of arbitration clauses, because the employee “would not
have had access to the alleged . . . information but for the employment
relationship with [the company].”190 This same rationale applies to qui tam
suits, and demonstrates that qui tam claims fall within the scope of relators’
employment agreements.

185. Stimula, 175 F.3d at 721; Am. Recovery Corp., 96 F.3d at 93; see Gore, 666 F.3d at 1036;
3M Co, 542 F.3d at 1199; Genesco, 815 F.2d at 846.
186. Atkins, 470 F.3d at 1359; Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1314.
187. U.S. ex rel. Lockhart v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1341 (N.D. Fla.
2007).
188. Id.; U.S. ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1359 (11th Cir. 2006); Hill v.
Morehouse Med. Assocs., Inc., No. 02-14429, 2003 WL 22019936 (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003); U.S.
ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002); see Corsello v.
Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008, 1014 (11th Cir. 2005) (dismissing on 9(b) grounds where relator
“conceded that he ‘did not have access to company files outside his own offices’”); see also Yuhasz
v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 567 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing portions of relator’s complaint
outlining relator’s duties).
189. Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511, 1517-18 (10th Cir. 1995).
190. GATX Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Weakland, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1165 (D. Colo. 2001).
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Additionally, even if relators could meet Rule 9(b)’s requirements
without providing such facts, savvy defendants could induce relators to
amend their complaints to include information “relating to” their
employment agreements (and force relators to arbitrate). In particular,
defendants would raise one of the most commonly litigated issues in qui tam
claims: the public disclosure bar.191 The FCA bars suits where facts about
the fraud have been publicly disclosed and the relator is not an original
source of the information.192 To prove that he or she is an original source, a
relator must plead facts showing that she (1) “has direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based”; and (2)
“has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an
action.”193 These requirements give artful defendants an opportunity to force
relators to reference their employment agreements and trigger the arbitration
clauses that govern employment disputes.
A defendant might do so in the following manner: after the relator files
her initial complaint, the defendant would file only a motion to dismiss (and
not a motion to compel arbitration). Within the motion to dismiss, the
defendant would argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
because the alleged frauds have already been publicly disclosed. The
defendant would further allege that the relator is not an “original source” for
two reasons. First, the relator could not have had “direct and independent
knowledge” of the alleged fraud because her job responsibilities did not give
her access to the relevant documents and personnel.194 Second, the relator
191. James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for Rogues,
Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1274 (2013).
192. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457,
467 (2007) (holding that § 3730(e)(4) “eliminates federal-court jurisdiction over actions”).
193. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 549 U.S. at 467.
194. Prather v. AT&T Inc., 2013 WL 5947131 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2013); see U.S. ex rel.
Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Servs., 163 F.3d 516, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1999) (The Court previously
dismissed a suit where the relators “did not discover firsthand the information underlying their
allegations of fraud. They did not see the fraud with their own eyes or obtain their knowledge of it
through their own labor unmediated by anything else.”).

235

Published by by
Published
Pepperdine
Pepperdine
Digital Digital
Commons,
Commons,
2015
2015

33
33

Pepperdine
Dispute
Resolution Law
Vol.Vol.
15, Iss.
[2015],
Art. 1 Art. 1
Pepperdine
Dispute
Resolution
LawJournal,
Journal,
15,2 Iss.
2 [2015],

[Vol. 15: 203, 2015]

Whistling in Silence
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

did not “voluntarily” make her submission, because the terms of the relator’s
employment require her to disclose potential frauds to the government (such
as an auditor agreement).195 In either case, the relator would have to plead
facts from her employment agreement relating to her professional
responsibilities,196 and amend her complaint.197 As soon as the relator does,
the defendant would file a motion to compel arbitration based on the new
factual allegations.198
In short, whether by intention or by clever lawyering, relators in qui tam
suits must demonstrate how they obtained their information about the
alleged frauds. This will often require relators to allege facts that “touch
matters in” or “significantly relate to” their employment contracts, and
would be sufficient to meet the standard for arbitrability in the majority of
circuits.

195. U.S. ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 161 F.3d 533, 541 (9th
Cir. 1998) (holding that although the relator was not an auditor, her job duties “included some
aspects of such work”); U.S. ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1995);
U.S. ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that relator was
not an “original source” where “it was [relator’s] responsibility, a condition of his employment, to
uncover fraud”); U.S. ex rel. Foust v. Grp. Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 26 F. Supp. 2d 60, 74
(D.D.C. 1998); Wercinski v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 982 F. Supp. 449, 461 (S.D. Tex. 1997); see
U.S. ex rel. Paranich v. Sorgnard, 396 F.3d 326, 340 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Fine, 72 F.3d at 743).
196. Biddle, 161 F.3d at 541; Fine, 72 F.3d at 743; LeBlanc, 913 F.2d at 20; U.S. ex rel.
Merena v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 114 F. Supp. 2d 352, 361 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Foust, 26 F. Supp.
2d at 74; Wercinski, 982 F. Supp. at 461.
197. Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Altman Specialty Plants, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7504(PGG), 2009 WL
222158, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2009).
198. Filing a motion to dismiss does not waive a parties’ right to compel arbitration. Sharif v.
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 376 F.3d 720, 726-27 (7th Cir. 2004); Williams v. Cigna Fin.
Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 661-62 (5th Cir. 1995); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 888
(2nd Cir. 1985); Lake Commc’ns, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473, 1477 (9th Cir. 1984).
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B. Relators’ Qui Tam Claims Are a Foreseeable Result of Relator’s
Contractual Duties
The second standard, adopted by a minority of circuits, establishes that a
claim “relates to” an employment agreement where it is “an immediate,
foreseeable result of the performance of contractual duties.”199 Under this
approach, the court asks whether “the dispute occur[ed] as a fairly direct
result of the performance of [the plaintiff’s] contractual duties,” such as the
plaintiff’s role as a supervisor of the defendant or its employees.200
Relators’ qui tam claims easily meet this foreseeability analysis.
Relators ordinarily obtain evidence about alleged frauds “as a fairly direct
result” of their contractual duties as supervisors and supervisees.201 Indeed,
the relators in some instances even participate in the fraud.202 Of course,
non-employees could theoretically submit qui tam claims. But these
instances are rare and often discouraged by the courts.203 For the most part,
if the relator had never worked for the company, she would never have
discovered the alleged frauds and could not have filed suit.
C. Qui Tam Claims Are Likely Legally Dependent on Relators’ Employment
Contracts
The final test, adopted by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, offers relators the
best opportunity to escape their arbitration clauses. Instead of focusing on
199. Telecom Italia, SpA v. Wholesale Telecom Corp., 248 F.3d 1109, 1116 (11th Cir. 2001);
see Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 46 (3d Cir. 1978).
200. Telecom Italia, SpA, 248 F.3d, at 1116.
201. U.S. ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740, 741 (9th Cir. 1995); see U.S. ex
rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 420, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
202. U.S. ex rel. Johnson v. Golden Gate Nat. Senior Care, LLC, 2012 WL 465676 (D. Minn.
Feb. 13, 2012); U.S. ex rel. Lockhart v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1341 (N.D.
Fla. 2007).
203. See U.S. ex rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1359 (11th Cir. 2006); U.S. ex rel.
Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002).
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“whether the complaint happens to reference the contract,” this test looks to
whether the elements of the plaintiff’s claim are “legally dependent on . . .
the underlying contract.”204 In other words, the two circuits look to whether
“an action could be maintained without reference to the contract or
relationship at issue.”205 Relators have a persuasive argument under this
standard that complying with Rule 9(b) is insufficient to warrant
arbitration.206 Pleading requirements are a procedural rule and not an actual
element of the plaintiff’s claim.207 Thus, while a complaint may happen to
reference the relator’s employment contract in order to plead fraud with
particularity, this alone is insufficient to warrant arbitration.
Nonetheless, relators cannot evade arbitration should defendants raise
the public disclosure bar, because the elements of an original source defense
are legally dependent on the relator’s employment responsibilities. In turn, it
is unlikely that a relator could prove her employment responsibilities
without reference to his or her employment contract.
A person’s
employment status is an individual matter of contract, and the Sixth Circuit
has often turned to employment agreements to determine a party’s
professional responsibilities before compelling arbitration.208 Given this

204. Ford v. NYLcare Health Plans of the Gulf Coast, Inc., 141 F.3d 243, 250-51 (5th Cir.
1998); Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 395 (6th Cir. 2003).
205. Fazio, 340 F.3d at 395.
206. Id.
207. U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(quoting U.S. ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1386 (D.C.Cir.1981) (holding that “Rule
9(b) is not . . . to be read in isolation from other procedural canons.”)); Richard D. Greenfield &
Robin Resnick, Rule 9(b): Docket Control Device or Safeguard Against Charges of Fraud?, in NEW
DIMENSIONS IN SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING & STRATEGIES 707, 715 (1992), available at
C751 ALI-ABA 707.
208. See Panepucci v. Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP, 281 F. App’x 482, 487-88 (6th
Cir. 2008) (holding that court could not determine whether a plaintiff qualified as an “employee”
under anti-discrimination laws without looking at her arbitration agreement); Fazio v. Lehman Bros.,
Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 395 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding fraud claim could not be adjudicating without
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precedent, relators face an uphill battle to show that they have “direct and
independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are
based” and have “voluntarily provided the information to the Government”
without providing documentation of their employment contracts. Thus,
while the “without reference” standard offers relators the best opportunity to
evade arbitration, defendants can still likely compel relators into arbitration
no matter the circuit, as relators’ qui tam claims “relate to” their employment
contracts and are therefore arbitrable.
VI. QUI TAM ARBITRATION COULD UNDERMINE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCA
As this article demonstrates, relators not only own their claims, but
those claims also ordinarily fall within the scope of relators’ arbitration
clauses. As with any statutory claim, however, qui tam actions cannot be
compelled into arbitration if Congress has “evinced an intention to preclude
a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”209 “If such an
intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of the [FCA], its
legislative history, or an ‘inherent conflict’ between arbitration and the
[FCA]’s underlying purposes.”210 As demonstrated below, by failing to add
anti-retaliation provisions to the FCA when it passed the Dodd-Frank Act in
2010, Congress has implicitly—and detrimentally—authorized arbitration of
qui tam suits.
Congress understood the perils of arbitration when it overhauled its
whistleblower statutes following the financial crisis. As part of the DoddFrank Act of 2010, Congress amended four different statutes to prohibit
arbitration of whistleblower suits brought under the acts.211 While Congress
describing “why [the defendant] was in control of the plaintiffs’ money and what the [the
defendant’s] obligations were”).
209. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
210. Id.
211. See statutes supra note 5.
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concurrently amended the FCA, it did not add an anti-arbitration provision
for qui tam claims.212
The legislative history of Dodd-Frank never clarified why Congress
amended only the four statutes to include anti-arbitration provisions and not
the FCA. The Senate Report on Dodd-Frank states more generally that
arbitration often “is unfair” because it involves “high upfront costs, limited
access to documents and other key information, limited knowledge upon
which to base the choice of arbitrator, the absence of a requirement that
arbitrators follow the law or issue written decisions, and extremely limited
grounds for appeal.”213
Despite Congress’s generalized concern, lower courts have refused to
read Dodd-Frank’s prohibition on arbitration to encompass the FCA or other
federal statutes.214 As the canon of statutory interpretation dictates, “When
Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to
have acted intentionally.”215 Courts, therefore, held that Congress forwent
its opportunity to prevent FCA claims from being arbitrated, by
strengthening the FCA’s anti-retaliation measures without also adding antiarbitration provisions.216
212. James v. Conceptus, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1029 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Dodd–Frank’s
antiarbitration amendments to other statutes cannot be extended by implication to the antiretaliation
provisions of the False Claims Act, especially when Dodd–Frank amended other parts of the False
Claims Act but not the provision at issue.”).
213. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010) (quoting AARP, Letter to Senators Dodd and Shelby,
November 19, 2009).
214. Holmes v. Air Liquide USA, L.L.C., 498 F. App’x 405, 407 (5th Cir. 2012) (declining to
extend anti-arbitration provision to the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Family and Medical Leave
Act); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, 2014 WL 285093 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014) (declining to extent
anti-arbitration provision to retaliation provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley); Beard v. Santander Consumer
USA, Inc., 2012 WL 1292576, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012) (declining to extent anti-arbitration
provision to Servicemembers Civil Relief Act); James, 851 F.Supp.2d at 1029.
215. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009); see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546
U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
216. James, 851 F.Supp.2d at 1029.
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Congress’s failure to amend the FCA cannot be explained away on the
grounds that the statute already prohibited arbitration. The standard for
establishing a congressional intent against arbitration based on a statute’s
text or legislative history is a weighty one. As the Supreme Court has held,
a plaintiff must show that “the text of the [statute] or its legislative history
explicitly precludes arbitration.”217 The text of the FCA is largely silent on
the issue. While the act states that any action “may be brought in any
judicial district,”218 courts have long recognized that the word “may” does
not require that actions be brought in a judicial forum.219 Similarly, the act
provides that an “action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney
General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for
consenting.”220 Nonetheless, a motion to compel arbitration is distinct from
a motion to dismiss. The former stays court proceedings for the duration of
the arbitration;221 the latter terminates the action without further hearing.222
While courts have never addressed the issue, the FCA does not appear to
require the Attorney General to consent to arbitration of a qui tam claim.
The legislative history of the FCA is equally silent on arbitration. The
words “arbitrate” or “arbitration” appear three times in the legislative
materials surrounding the 1986 Amendments: (1) in a copy of a boilerplate
arbitration agreement;223 (2) in a written submission from a Los Angeles

217. Id.
218. 31 U.S.C. § 3732 (2012).
219. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).
220. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
221. Teressa L. Elliott, Responsibility of the Courts in Motions to Compel Arbitration, 32 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 89, 94 (2006).
222. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (7th ed. 1999).
223. Federal Securities Laws and Defense Contracting—Part 1, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House
of Representatives, 99th Cong. 581 (February 28 and March 25, 1985).
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based lawyer critical of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) system;224 and
(3) in written testimony from an attorney for a utilities company (also
criticizing the ALJ system).225 In short, because the text and legislative
history of the FCA neither permit nor prohibit arbitration, they fail to show
that Congress intended qui tam claims to be unarbitrable.
Relators’ best chance at escaping their arbitration clauses, therefore, will
be to demonstrate that there is an “inherent conflict” between arbitration and
the FCA’s underlying purposes. Nonetheless, relators face an uphill battle,
as the Supreme Court addressed and rejected many of relators’ strongest
arguments in its 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.226
There, the Court held that claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) can be subject to arbitration, even though
arbitration conflicts with the statute’s social purposes, is agreed to on a takeit-or-leave-it basis, impairs cooperation between plaintiffs and the
Government, and severely limits discovery.227
The rest of this part addresses the sources of conflict raised in Gilmer
and examines whether relators can sufficiently distinguish the FCA from the
ADEA so as to keep their claims in court. In doing so, it shows that while
arbitration would significantly impair qui tam litigation—and potentially
blunt relators’ ability to litigate their claims—that conflict is not so
“inherent” under prevailing Supreme Court case law as to render arbitration
clauses unenforceable. As a result, defendants can undermine enforcement
of the FCA without losing their ability to arbitrate.

224. Program Fraud Civil Penalties Act of 1985, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States
Senate, 99th Cong. 339 (June 18, 1985) (statement of J.H. McQuiston).
225. Overview of False Claims and Fraud Legislation, Hearing Before the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, 99th Cong.123 (June 17, 1986) (statement of Edward Sneeden).
226. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
227. Id. at 27-33.
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A. The Broad Social Purposes of the FCA Do Not Invalidate Arbitration
The first source of conflict is also the most intuitive—arbitration
interferes with the social purposes of the FCA. Whistleblowing furthers
societal interests by breaking the “conspiracy of silence” surrounding frauds
and “bring[ing] such wrongdoing to light.”228 Arbitration, on the other hand,
protects individual interests by ensuring secrecy, brevity, and
inscrutability.229 The combination of the two seems untenable: how can a
relator blow the whistle if no one can hear?
This difficulty with this argument is that the FCA achieves its social
goals without bringing wrongdoing to public light. Whistleblowers are
barred from publicly disclosing their allegations prior to filing a complaint
with the DOJ230 and from publicly discussing their complaints while their
filings remain under seal with the agency.231 In addition, the text of the FCA
permits the Department of Justice to “pursue [FCA claims] through any
alternate remedy available to the Government,” including arbitration, and
agency guidelines favor the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in
qui tam cases.232 As the DOJ’s “Policy on the Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution” establishes, almost 90% of FCA actions settle and
approximately half of those do so prior to the agency’s filing a complaint in
court.233 Thus, “[t]he nature of the cases indicates that they are good
candidates for ADR mechanisms.”234

228. U.S. ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 161 F.3d 533, 539 (9th Cir.
1998).
229. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1625 (2005)
230. Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 478 (2007).
231. JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 4.04 (4th ed. 2013).
232. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2012); United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 324 (4th
Cir. 2001) (compelling DOJ into nonbinding arbitration).
233. Policy on the Use of Alt. Dispute Resolution, 61 Fed.Reg. 36895, 36899 (1996).
234. Id.
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Given that the FCA serves its deterrent function by revealing
wrongdoing to the DOJ, not necessarily to the general public, the social
policy argument fails to show that qui tam arbitration inherently conflicts
with the purposes of the FCA. As the Supreme Court held in Gilmer, “[S]o
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her]
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to
serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”235
B. Arbitration Clauses in Qui Tam Actions Are Not a Unique Form of
Adhesion Contract
The second argument against qui tam arbitration is that relators should
not be bound by adhesion contracts when suing on behalf of the
Government. The court in Gilmer left open whether in some circumstances
a contract of adhesion would render an arbitration contract unenforceable.236
Subsequently, one lower court has held that qui tam actions are not
arbitrable because arbitration clauses in qui tam actions are a unique form of
As the argument goes, arbitration clauses in
adhesion contract.237
employment contracts are ordinarily non-negotiable.238 Additionally, while
a relator is not an officer of the Government, she does act on its behalf.
Given this relationship, the rationale in favor of federal court jurisdiction is
like the rationale behind 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a),239 which allows removal from
state to federal court of any case in which an officer of the United States is a
defendant for “the protection of agents of the government when they do the
Government’s business.”240
235. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
236. Id. at 32-33.
237. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 121 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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This argument suffers from several problems. First, this type of
adhesion contract is “unfair” only if the court assumes that arbitrators will be
biased against the Government or relators. The Supreme Court in Gilmer,
however, “decline[d] to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral
body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain
competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators.”241 Second, the argument
that relators are pseudo-agents of the Government creates a double standard.
The only reason that relators can release (or sell) their claims is that they are
not government officials.242 It is therefore contradictory to bar relators from
arbitrating their claims on the grounds that they are effectively government
officials, while at the same time permitting them to sell their claims because
they are not. The adhesion contract objection is thus unavailing.
C. While Arbitration Would Impair Cooperation Between Relators and the
DOJ, This Is Not an “Inherent” Conflict Sufficient to Prevent
Arbitration
The strongest argument against qui tam arbitration is its effect on the
DOJ. In order to enforce the FCA, the DOJ depends on “cooperation” from
“individuals who are either close observers or otherwise involved in the
fraudulent activity.”243 Relators’ assistance covers a range of tasks, such as
providing the Government factual and legal research, drafting internal
government position papers, interviewing fact witnesses, preparing the
Government’s expert witnesses, reviewing documents produced by
defendants, and supplying paralegals and other clerical help to the
241. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
242. As a general rule, a public officer cannot assign unearned salary or fees of his or her
office. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 100, at 77-79. The rule prevents public officers from being
deprived of their means of support, which might impair performance of their services.
243. U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d
1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting S.REP. NO. 345, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5271).

245

Published by by
Published
Pepperdine
Pepperdine
Digital Digital
Commons,
Commons,
2015
2015

43
43

Pepperdine
Dispute
Resolution Law
Vol.Vol.
15, Iss.
[2015],
Art. 1 Art. 1
Pepperdine
Dispute
Resolution
LawJournal,
Journal,
15,2 Iss.
2 [2015],

[Vol. 15: 203, 2015]

Whistling in Silence
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

government.244 As a result, courts have described relators’ cooperation as
“crucial to the ‘successful resolution of the [DOJ’s] case.’”245
Arbitration undermines this “informal coordination among individual
claimants.”246 Through confidentiality provisions, arbitration clauses would
likely prevent relators from arranging with the Government to produce
common research and reports.247 Further, even if the Government did go to
trial, whistleblowers would not be able to act as co-litigants in the case.248
Thus, even if the DOJ were to intervene in a qui tam suit, the agency would
have to litigate alone and without the relator’s assistance at trial.
This conflict, although significant, is likely not so “inherent” under
Supreme Court case law as to render qui tam arbitration unenforceable. The
Supreme Court in Gilmer rejected a similar cooperation-based objection in

244. Robert Fabrikant & Nkechinyem Nwabuzor, In the Shadow of the False Claims Act:
“Outsourcing” the Investigation by Government Counsel to Relator Counsel During the Seal
Period, 83 N.D. L. REV. 837, 843 (2007); Suzanne Durrell, The Relator’s Role in False Claims Act
Investigations: Towards a New Paradigm, DURRELL L. OFF. 8-14 (2012),
http://www.taf.org/2012%20TAFEF%20Conference%20Documents/Durrell%20Article%20-%20Relator’s%20Role%20in%20FCA%20Investigations.pdf.
245. Miller v. Holzmann, 575 F. Supp. 2d 2, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of
Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
246. Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 2316. Recently, the SEC has cracked down on employers’ use of confidentiality
provisions to limit whistleblowers from filing complaints with the agency. James Burns et al., SEC
Brings First Whistleblower Enforcement Action for Overly Restrictive Confidentiality Agreements,
Wilkie
Farr
&
Gallagher
LLP
1
(2015),
http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2015/04/SEC_Brings_First_Whistleblower_Enf
orcement_Action_for_Overly_Restrictive_Confidentiality_Agreements.pdf.
The SEC did so
pursuant to Rule 21F-17, which prohibits any person from enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a
confidentiality agreement that impedes an employee’s ability to reports a possible securities law
violation to the SEC. Id. The DOJ lacks a similar rule to enforce reporting under the FCA, and
therefore is unlikely to be able to police the use of confidentiality agreements as aggressively as the
SEC.
248. Id. (“The agreement also disallows any kind of joinder or consolidation of claims or
parties.”).
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the context of the ADEA.249 While the ADEA does not contain a qui tam
provision, the statute creates a mechanism through which an individual
brings a private cause of action.250 In order to bring suit, an aggrieved
individual must first file a charge with the EEOC and then wait at least 180
days.251 If the EEOC declines to bring a charge, the individual may litigate
the case on her own. If the EEOC files suit, the employee loses her cause of
action but may intervene in the EEOC’s case.252 The statute, therefore,
envisions that the individual and agency will cooperate extensively during
the litigation.253
As the Gilmer Court held, the fact that arbitration may impair
cooperation between individuals and the Government does not necessarily
render the conflict “inherent.”254 For a cooperation-based conflict to
foreclose arbitration, an arbitration clause must do more than undermine
those select disputes in which the Government and individuals cooperate.
Instead, plaintiffs must demonstrate “that Congress intended that the
[Government] be involved in all . . . disputes,” such that arbitration would
conflict with all litigation brought under the statute.255
Relators face an uphill battle under this standard. The FCA contemplates
instances in which the Government would not be involved in litigation. For
example, the FCA allows relators to proceed independently when the DOJ
declines a suit—the situation in the majority of qui tam actions.256

249. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1991).
250. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2012).
251. Id.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1).
253. Kozlowski v. Extendicare Health Serv., Inc., No. 99-4338, 2000 WL 193502 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 17, 2000).
254. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28-29.
255. Id.
256. Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An
Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 971 (2007) (noting that the DOJ declined to intervene
in seventy-eight percent of cases between 1987 and 2004).
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Moreover, even where the DOJ does intervene, the FCA enables to the
Government to limit relators’ assistance. The statute provides that the
Government upon intervening assumes “primary responsibility for
prosecuting the action,”257 and grants the DOJ the ability to restrict the
Accordingly, even if the
relator’s involvement in the litigation.258
Government did have a role in all qui tam litigation, relators arguably do not
(other than serving as a named party in the dispute). The fact that the DOJ is
“heavily involved” in the enforcement of the FCA therefore is likely “not
sufficient to preclude arbitration.”259
The DOJ’s enforcement of the FCA does differ in one significant way
from the EEOC’s enforcement of the ADEA. The DOJ has the right to
intervene in the private litigant’s action,260 and may intervene either initially
when a relator files a complaint, or later when the agency has declined a
complaint but shows “good cause” for entering the suit.261 Qui tam
arbitration raises a unique dilemma under the latter scenario. Should the
DOJ intervene once the suit has been declined and the relator has been
compelled into arbitration, it would appear that the agency would also have
to enter arbitration. After all, there are no ongoing court proceedings into
which the DOJ could intervene. Thus, qui tam arbitration raises the
possibility that the Government—as a non-signatory to a private arbitration
agreement—could lose its right to a judicial proceeding.
Despite this concern, the DOJ can most likely pursue its action in court.
When a court compels arbitration it ordinarily does not dismiss the action.262
Instead, the judge stays the proceedings for the duration of the arbitration.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1).
Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C)-(D).
Id.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1), (3).
Supra Section I.
MediVas, LLC v. Marubeni Corp., 741 F.3d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 2014).
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As a result, the DOJ does not intervene in the arbitration itself when it
intervenes in a relator’s suit. It intervenes in the stayed court proceeding.263
Under these circumstances, a cooperation-based challenge would likely
be unsuccessful unless an arbitration clause prevents a relator from filing a
complaint with the DOJ.264 An arbitration agreement concerning the FCA,
however, likely would not prohibit a relator from filing a complaint.265 Even
if a defendant were to draft an arbitration clause prohibiting DOJ filings, that
clause would be impossible to enforce in practice. Since relators file
complaints with the DOJ under seal, defendants do not discover the
pendency of a qui tam action until after the DOJ unseals the action.266 By
that time, it is too late to un-inform the Government of the relator’s
allegations.

263. See THOMAS H. OEHMKE, 3 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 61:19 (2013) (“[W]hile a
nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement has no right to participate in arbitration . . . intervention
may be requested if and when that arbitral proceeding enters the judicial system (e.g., motion to
compel arbitration, to appoint an arbitrator, to vacate or confirm an award, and the like).”). The
Supreme Court’s decision in Rockwell International Corp. v. United States also supports this
interpretation. Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 477 (2007) (quoting United
States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 614 F.2d 843, 845 (C.A.3 1979)). There, the Court held that the public
disclosure bar prevented a relator from proceeding in court because the relator had disclosed
information about the alleged frauds to the FBI, which then transmitted the information to the media.
The Court concluded that the inability of the relator to bring suit did not prevent the DOJ from
intervening in the action. Id. As the Supreme Court ruled, “an intervenor’s claim does not rise and
fall with the claim of the original party.” Id. Instead, as an intervenor, the DOJ can proceed in court
even if a relator cannot.
264. As the Gilmer court recognized, plaintiffs have a stronger argument that “arbitration will
undermine the role of the [Government]” should arbitration disrupt plaintiffs’ “free[dom] to file a
charge with [a Government agency].” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28
(1991).
265. See Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., No. 3:12-cv-63, 2013 WL 394875 (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 31, 2013).
266. Jay A. Brozost & A. Jeff Ifrah, I Tell Them, I Tell Them Not: Deciding When and How to
Disclose False Claims Act Lawsuits to Shareholders, ACC DOCKET, January/February 2008, at 44,
51.

249

Published by by
Published
Pepperdine
Pepperdine
Digital Digital
Commons,
Commons,
2015
2015

47
47

Pepperdine
Dispute
Resolution Law
Vol.Vol.
15, Iss.
[2015],
Art. 1 Art. 1
Pepperdine
Dispute
Resolution
LawJournal,
Journal,
15,2 Iss.
2 [2015],

[Vol. 15: 203, 2015]

Whistling in Silence
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

D. FCA Claims Do Not Require Greater Discovery Than Other Arbitrable
Claims
The final argument against qui tam arbitration is that arbitral
proceedings would hinder discovery and prevent relators from vindicating
their actions. Qui tam suits often involve allegations of thousands of false
claims made by over a hundred defendants across dozens of states.267 Thus,
plaintiffs must obtain a “massive number of documents” in order to prove
their claims.268
It is no secret that arbitration diminishes discovery. As one court has
put it, “A hallmark of arbitration—and a necessary precursor to its efficient
operation—is a limited discovery process.”269 Arbitral houses, therefore,
give “almost total discretion to arbitrators” to grant or deny discovery in
large commercial proceedings.270 Arbitration clauses often limit the number
of available depositions,271 and it is unclear whether arbitrators can compel
non-party discovery.272 As a result, relators face the specter of a
significantly curtailed discovery process in arbitration. Indeed, the very fact
267. See, e.g., United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 469 F.3d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 2006)
(noting that the relator filed its complaint against 132 hospitals across thirty states); U.S. ex rel. VenA-Care v. Actavis Mid Atl. LLC, 659 F. Supp. 2d 262, 271 (D. Mass. 2009) (denying motion to
dismiss where the qui tam relator’s complaint alleged that pharmaceutical companies had filed tens
of thousands of fraudulent Medicaid claims).
268. See Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992); Michael Loucks, Impacts
of the Affordable Care Act and Anti-Kickback Legislation on Health Care Industry Clients,
ASPATORE, June 2013, at 1, 10, available at 2013 WL 3772666 (predicting that the scope of
discovery will increase with the passage of the Affordable Care Act and the statute’s additional
reporting requirements on health care organizations).
269. COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 276 (4th Cir. 1999).
270. David W. Lannetti, Protecting Contracting Parties in Construction Arbitrations Based on
the Availability—or Nonavailability—of Nonparty Discovery, CONSTR. LAW, Fall 2009, at 24, 24-25.
271. John Wilkinson, Arbitration Contract Clauses: A Potential Key to a Cost-Effective
Process, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 9, 9-10.
272. Daniel R. Strader, Bridging the Gap: Amending the Federal Arbitration Act to Allow
Discovery of Nonparties, 41 STETSON L. REV. 909, 922-23 (2012)
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that defendants wish to compel qui tam claims into arbitration appears to
evidence this threat.
Despite these risks, it is unlikely that relators would prevail on
discovery-related objections to arbitration. The Supreme Court has required
arbitration of numerous complex commercial disputes requiring substantial
discovery, including securities cases, antitrust suits, and RICO claims.273
While complex, it is unclear that qui tam cases require more documentation
than other arbitrable disputes.274 And as the Supreme Court held in Gilmer,
courts will not deny arbitration “based on speculation that the arbitrator may
not allow adequate discovery.”275
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ARBITRATION ON THE DOJ
As the previous part demonstrates, qui tam arbitration would not
“inherently” conflict with the purposes of the FCA. Nonetheless, there is
still significant conflict. Arbitration impairs the DOJ’s ability to cooperate
with whistleblowers, and limits the amount of discovery available to
relators. Given the complexity of qui tam claims, compulsory arbitration
could blunt the effectiveness of the FCA and tip the scales in defendants’
favor. The extent to which this will occur is an empirical question.
Empirics aside, corporate defendants will likely aggressively seek qui
tam arbitration in the coming years. The reason relates to a “new procedural
development” in how the DOJ investigates and intervenes in suits.276 As
273. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am.
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
274. In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 285-87 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re
Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D.Ill.1979)) (compelling arbitration of
antitrust claim even though “the heart of any American antitrust case is the discovery of business
documents. Without them, there is virtually no case.”).
275. Id.
276. Grayson Yeargin & Conor S. Harris, Government’s Increased Use of Noncommittal
Intervention Filings Complicates Qui Tam Proceedings Under the False Claims Act, NIXON
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originally envisioned by Congress, a qui tam complaint remains under seal
for sixty days upon filing, during which time the DOJ investigates and
decides whether to intervene.277 While Congress intended a prompt
investigation,278 the agency’s limited resources have made this impossible.279
The DOJ instead has aggressively moved the courts to lengthen the seal
period for pending claims and grant the agency more time to investigate.
While courts initially complied with the DOJ’s requests,280 judges have
grown increasingly impatient with the agency as seal times have grown to
six times the original length contemplated by the FCA.281 As a result, the
DOJ has shifted tactics. Instead of moving to extend the seal period, the
agency has begun unsealing cases while issuing notices that DOJ will not
intervene “at this time.”282 Under the DOJ’s new approach, relators will be
expected to carry cases forward by beginning discovery and shouldering the
costs themselves, with the hope that the DOJ will eventually intervene.283
The DOJ’s change in policy could create an arbitrable tipping point.
Given the DOJ’s backlog of over one thousand sealed complaints284—and
PEABODY
LLP,
Apr.
18,
2013,
at
1,
1,
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/156465_GIWC_Alert_Qui_Tam_Proceedural_Developments_1
8APR2013.pdf.
277. JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 4.04 (4th ed. 2013).
278. Id. (“The government must substantiate any claims of ‘good cause’ before an extension
may be granted. In its consideration of what constitutes ‘good cause,’ Congress specifically rejected
justifications such as the prosecutor’s workload or the mere existence of a criminal investigation.”).
279. In recent years, the number of complaints filed with the DOJ has skyrocketed, leaving the
agency with over 1,300 sealed cases as of January 2011. See John T. Bentivoglio et al., False
Claims Act Investigations: Time for a New Approach?, SKADDEN (May 12, 2011),
http://skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51&itemID=2421 (“We predict that there will be an
increase in the number of cases where the government delays an intervention decision, and the
litigation is pushed forward by the whistleblower and his/her attorney.”).
280. Id.
281. Id.; see Yeargin & Harris, supra note 276.
282. Yeargin & Harris, supra note 276, at 2.
283. Id.
284. See Bentivoglio et al., supra note 279.
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judicial pressure on the agency to make more rapid intervention decisions—
a considerable number of qui tam actions will enter the judiciary in the short
term. In response, defendants will likely try to contain the costs of
defending such actions by aggressively seeking arbitration.285 Since the
federal courts have already begun to hold qui tam claims arbitrable, judges
have an alternative to letting declined actions mount on their dockets:
compel arbitration. Indeed, it is telling that the decision in Deck—the first
judicial opinion compelling qui tam arbitration—came within three months
of the DOJ’s change in policy.286
As the rest of this part demonstrates, qui tam arbitration could tip the
balance in defendants’ favor by doing more than simply limiting relator’s
rights. While an adverse judgment in arbitration almost certainly would be
binding on a relator, qui tam arbitration could also limit the right of the
Government to a judicial forum. Should the DOJ intervene into a relator’s
action, defendants might be able to compel the agency into arbitration.
Likewise, if the DOJ intervenes after an adverse judgment in arbitration, the
agency could be barred from relitigating the claims or issues. If either of
these scenarios were to occur, qui tam arbitration could do what no
arbitrable claim has done before. It could limit the Government’s right to
prosecute actions based on an arbitration clause signed only by private
individuals.287

285. According to a survey from 1998, the average cost of defending a declined action was
$1,431,660. William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in
Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 226 (1998).
286. Compare Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Jan.
31, 2013), with Yeargin & Harris, supra note 276.
287. See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002) (declining to decide whether
an adverse judgment against an individual bringing a claim under the ADEA would bar an executive
agency from bringing a claim for the same conduct under the act).
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A. An Adverse Judgment in Arbitration Would Be Binding on Relators
The district court in Deck (the first decision to order qui tam arbitration)
left open a significant question—whether an adverse judgment in arbitration
would be binding on relators. The court compelled what it called
“mandatory” arbitration, which is an ambiguous term that could be either
binding or non-binding.288 Despite this oversight, relators are unlikely to
avoid an adverse judgment should the arbitration not go in their favor. As
previously noted, parties can be bound by an adverse judgment in arbitration
even if there are other “real parties in interest” that did not participate.289
Furthermore, district courts lack discretion to order non-binding arbitration
where the parties’ contracts specifically call for binding arbitration.290 Thus,
given that arbitration clauses ordinarily mandate binding arbitration,291 it is
unlikely that qui tam arbitration would be non-binding.
Additionally, it is unlikely that the DOJ could release relators from
arbitration by intervening in the suits.292 On the one hand, the FCA does
state that if the Government intervenes, it “shall not be bound by an act of
the person bringing the action.”293 Nonetheless, the FCA does not state that
the relator shall not be bound. The Supreme Court’s decision in Rockwell

288. Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866, 884 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
289. Supra note 154.
290. McKee v. Home Buyers Warranty Corp. II, 45 F.3d 981, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1995); O’Hara
v. Dist., 56 F.3d 1514, 1522 (D.C. Cir. 1995); St. Lawrence Explosives Corp. v. Worthy Bros.
Pipeline Corp., 916 F. Supp. 187, 190 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding arbitration can be non-binding only
if the parties explicitly state so in their contract); see Com. Enterprises v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 958
F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1992) (compelling non-binding arbitration because contract was ambiguous);
Centurion Air Cargo, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
aff’d, 420 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2005) (compelling binding arbitration in the “absence of language in
the policy indicating that the arbitration clause was non-binding).
291. 9 BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS § 48:20 (2014).
292. The DOJ declines to intervene in the majority of qui tam actions—meaning this scenario
would be a rarity. Broderick, supra note 256, at 971.
293. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012).
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(described in Part VI.B.) illustrates this point.294 There, a relator made a
public disclosure that disqualified him from bringing a claim.295 The DOJ
then intervened in the action, and argued that its participation should absolve
the relator of its public disclosure.296 The Supreme Court nonetheless barred
the relator from participating in the suit.297 If the DOJ’s intervention
decision cannot cure a public disclosure made by a relator, it also cannot
wipe away an arbitration agreement.
Thus, the DOJ’s degree of
participation in a qui tam suit cannot release a relator from binding
arbitration.
B. If the DOJ Declines an Action but Later Intervenes, Defendants Might Be
Able to Compel the Agency into Arbitration
As the previous discussion demonstrates, relators are unlikely to escape
enforcement of their arbitration clauses. There is a remaining question,
however, as to whether a relator’s arbitration agreement could limit the
Government from litigating its own FCA claims in court. As a general rule, a
court can compel into arbitration only those parties that are signatories to an
arbitration agreement.298 Nonetheless, federal courts have recognized a
number of theories, arising out of common law principles of contract and
agency, under which nonsignatories may be bound to the arbitration
agreements of others.299 Among these theories, a nonsignatory can be forced
294. Supra Section V.B.; Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 477 (2007).
295. Rockwell, 549 U.S. at 477.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995)
(quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80
S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960) (“Arbitration is contractual by nature—‘a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.’”).
299. Reid v. Doe Run Res. Corp., 701 F.3d 840, 846 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Noble Drilling
Servs. v. Certex USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2010)); Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers v.
Optibase, Ltd., 337 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2003).
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to arbitrate if it “knowingly seek[s] and obtain[s] ‘direct benefits’ from the
contract” containing the arbitration clause.300 Based on this doctrine of
equitable estoppel, defendants potentially could compel the DOJ into
arbitration should the agency initially decline to intervene in qui tam action
but later change its mind.
When the DOJ intervenes in a declined suit, it ordinarily does so based
on information produced in the legal proceedings.301 The FCA itself states
that “[i]f the Government so requests, it shall be served with copies of all
pleadings filed in the [declined] action and . . . copies of all deposition
transcripts.”302 By the same token, if the DOJ intervenes in a suit that has
gone to arbitration, it likely will have done so based on materials from the
actual arbitration.
There is an open question as to whether the DOJ, by knowingly seeking
and obtaining this information, receives a “direct” benefit from the contract
containing the arbitration clause sufficient to warrant arbitration of the
agency’s claims. Like any issue of causation, “directness” is not black and
white concept but rather operates on a sliding scale.303 This ambiguity gives
defendants the opportunity to compel the Government into arbitration.
The Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Blaustein v. Huete illustrates the
point.304 There, a company signed a fee agreement (containing an arbitration
clause) for legal services from a law firm.305 An employee of the company
later sued the law firm for malpractice and other claims, based on the
employee’s “separate attorney-client relationships with the [law firm] . . .

300. Id.
301. Bentivoglio et al., supra note 279; Yeargin & Harris, supra note 276, at 2.
302. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
303. Rashad v. Walsh, 300 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The inquiry into causation involves a
sliding scale: deliberately dilatory tactics must be weighed more heavily against the state than
periods of delay resulting from negligence.”).
304. Blaustein v. Huete, 449 F. App’x 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2011).
305. Id. at 349-50.
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not the relationship embodied in the fee agreement.”306 The Fifth Circuit
nonetheless compelled arbitration of a non-signatory employee’s claims.307
As the court held, the non-signatory “embraced” the arbitration contract
because he “obtained the same sort of benefits from the fee agreement that a
client would have received: research, reasoning, drafting, and filing, all
informed by the [attorney’s] legal training.”308 Had the contract not existed,
the non-signatory “would have had to hire his own . . . attorney to perform
these tasks.”309 Further, because some of the employee’s allegations referred
to the company “by name,” these allegations “invite[d] [the court] to
reference the fee agreement” and the arbitration clause therein, and therefore
made it appropriate for the court to compel arbitration.310
The relationship between the DOJ and a relator bears some similar
characteristics. The DOJ is not an employee of a relator. However, by using
the FCA’s statutory provisions to seek and obtain arbitration materials, the
DOJ receives benefits from arbitration through access to materials that
would ordinarily be confidential.311 Without the relator’s arbitration clause,
these documents would not exist, and the agency “would have had to hire
[its] own . . . attorney to perform these tasks.” Further, given that the DOJ
would undoubtedly reference the relator “by name” during the litigation,
306. Id. at 349.
307. Id. at 350.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See generally Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., No. 13 CV 3410(HB), 2013
WL 5322573 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2013) (noting parties’ arbitration clause agreed to keep all
pleadings and depositions confidential); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Randall & Quilter Reins. Co.,
No. 2:07-cv-0120, 2007 WL 2326878 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2007) (noting typical form agreement for
arbitration includes a clause providing that “briefs, depositions, and hearing transcripts generated in
the course of the arbitration and documents produced during the arbitration, as well as the final
arbitration decision itself, will all be kept confidential”); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent
Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1625 (2005) (noting general trend toward confidentiality in
arbitration).
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since the relator is a party to the action,312 this may also invite the court to
reference the relator’s employment contract and the arbitration clause
therein.
This argument does suffer from its flaws. Receiving a benefit from a
contract containing an arbitration clause is not sufficient to compel a nonsignatory into arbitration.313 The benefit must be “direct,” and a benefit is
merely indirect “where the nonsignatory exploits the contractual relation of
parties to an agreement, but does not exploit (and thereby assume) the
agreement itself.”314
The Second Circuit’s decision in Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration
Ass’n is exemplary.315 There, two companies contracted to trade with each
other and signed an arbitration clause.316 A third-party competitor then
acquired one of the companies.317 The Second Circuit held that the
competitor could not be later compelled into arbitration.318 As the court
reasoned, if the competitor had “directly benefitted from the . . . Agreement
by seeking to purchase equipment . . . it would be estopped from avoiding
arbitration.”319 Nonetheless, the competitor’s benefit derived solely from the
purchase of one of the companies and not from the contract itself—
therefore, rendering the benefit “indirect.”320
Based on this decision, the DOJ has a strong argument that any benefit it
derives from the arbitration clause is indirect. Like the competitor in
Thomson-CSF, the DOJ has purchased the services of an entity—the relator.

312.
313.
2001).
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2012).
MAG Portfolio Consultant, GMBH v. Merlin Biomed Grp. LLC, 268 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir.
Id.
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 775-76.
Id.
Id. at 778-79.
Id. at 779.
Id.
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In turn, when the DOJ requests information from the relator, it “exploits” the
contractual relationship between the relator and the defendant rather than the
employment agreement itself. Since the DOJ is a passive recipient of
information from the relator, any benefit it derives would be indirect.
This argument is persuasive and, in isolation, would likely lead a court
to reject an attempt to compel the DOJ into arbitration. Nonetheless, courts
adjudicating the issue of “direct benefits” estoppel should be mindful that
“directness” is only a proxy for a more fundamental inquiry: whether it
would be inequitable to allow a non-signatory to derive benefits from
arbitration, but still permit that entity to proceed in court. And in this equity
analysis, defendants have a potential advantage.
Common law rules of partial assignment allow a defendant to join the
assignor and partial assignee to the same lawsuit.321 This right protects the
defendant’s interest in being “free of successive and repeated suits growing
out of the same basic facts.”322 Based on this principle, a defendant could
request the court to join the Government to the arbitration. Even if the
Government’s benefit is arguably “indirect,” a separate judicial action raises
the specter of repeated suits based on the same operative facts. Regardless
of the merits of arbitration, a court may find it inequitable to allow the
Government to use information from a confidential arbitral proceeding to
bring its own judicial proceeding for the same conduct and on the same
claims. As a result, a court might join the Government to the relator’s
arbitration.
Compelling arbitration in the context of a partial assignment is not
unprecedented. Only one federal court has considered arbitration based on

321. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 158 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976); 4 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 889 (1951) (“[U]nless the obligor has consented, the partial assignee may not
maintain the original suit against the obligor unless all parties having the collective right to the entire
claim are joined in the proceeding.”); In re Fine Paper Litig. State of Wash., 632 F.2d 1081, 1091
(3d Cir. 1980) (quoting same).
322. Fine Paper Litig., 632 F.2d at 1091.
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common law rules of partial assignment.323 There, a plaintiff who had
partially assigned its claim sought to arbitrate disputes arising out of a
charter contract.324 In addition to granting the motion to compel, the court
added that it must “protect the respondent from a possible multiple claim”
and “avoid piecemeal litigation in case of a partial assignment.”325 As a
result, the court ordered both the assignor and the partial assignee into
arbitration—even though only one of the parties had signed the original
charter contract.326
In sum, both defendants and the Government have strong arguments as
to whether the benefit that the state derives from relators is sufficiently
direct to compel arbitration. In light of the common law right to join
assignors and partial assignees into the same proceeding, however, courts
could logically conclude that the balance of the equities would favor
arbitration. As a result, corporate defendants could prevent the DOJ from to
avoiding arbitration’s limitations on discovery and blunt the agency’s ability
to intervene and prosecute qui tam suits.
C. If the DOJ Does Not Intervene, the Agency Could Be Bound by an
Adverse Judgment Against a Relator
Given the risks of intervening while the relator’s arbitration is ongoing,
the DOJ may decide to intervene only once the arbitration has concluded.
The agency could then enter the suit when the relator appeals the arbitration
judgment in federal district court. This approach could free the agency to
relitigate the claims and issues decided in the relator’s suit de novo, as the
agency was a non-party to the arbitration and therefore would not bound by
doctrines of preclusion.
323.
1961).
324.
325.
326.

See Tex. San Juan Oil Corp. v. An-Son Offshore Drilling Co., 194 F. Supp. 396 (S.D.N.Y.
Id.
Id.
Id.; 1 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 13:13 (2014).
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Preclusion doctrines prevent parties from relitigating the same claims or
issues finally decided in a prior adjudication.327 Generally, a person who
was not a party to the previous action will not be bound by the judgment, as
he or she “has not had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the claims and
issues settled in that suit.”328 Thus, at first glance, the Government would
not be bound by an adverse judgment against a relator in arbitration, since it
was never a party to the action.
Nonetheless, the DOJ’s freedom to relitigate in district court is not as
clear as the rules on non-party preclusion may seem. There are exceptions
to the general rule that non-parties are not bound by prior adjudications. In
particular, nonparties can be barred from relitigating claims or issues if they
share a substantive legal relationship justifying preclusion with the previous
legal party (“privity”).329
The Supreme Court has determined that the United States shares such a
relationship with relators—at least where a whistleblower proceeds in court.
330
As the Court recently held in Eisenstein, the “United States is bound by
the judgment in all FCA actions regardless of its participation in the case.”331
Whether this statement applies to arbitration is difficult to decipher, as the
Court did not fully elaborate on its rationale. The Court stated only that if
“the United States believes that its rights are jeopardized by an ongoing qui
tam action, the FCA provides for intervention.”332
Despite the Supreme Court’s brevity, its justification echoes an
exception to nonparty preclusion. As the Court has recognized, a nonparty
that has “assumed control” over litigation will be bound by the judgment,
since the nonparty has had “the opportunity to present proofs and argument”

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008).
Id.
Id. at 894.
U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 936 (2009).
Id.
Id.
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and “had his day in court.”333 Thus, even if the Government declines to
intervene in a suit, is not a party, and takes no active role in the case other
than requesting service of the pleadings, it will still be bound by the
judgment.334 Indeed, the lower courts have used the same rationale for
nearly twenty years to prevent the Government from relitigating issues or
claims already decided in relators’ suits.335
Eisenstein and lower court precedent raise significant questions of
whether an adverse judgment against a relator in arbitration would preclude
the Government from relitigating issues or claims in court. On the one hand,
those decisions were not in the context of arbitration, and both courts and
commentators have disagreed on whether arbitration should have any
preclusive effect on statutory claims. Over the years, lower courts have
struck “a case-by-case balance” in determining when preclusion principles
apply to final determinations in arbitration.336 This balancing reflects the
courts’ longstanding tendency “to be suspicious of relaxed arbitration
procedures” and the “murkiness or absence of an arbitral opinion.”337 While
many of the courts have rejected preclusion stemming from arbitration,338
others have “yielded.”339
333. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 895 (2008) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 39
(1982)).
334. Id. at 928.
335. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Stoner v. Santa
Clara Cnty. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007)); U.S. ex rel. Mergent Servs. v.
Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing same); Stoner, 502 F.3d at 1126 (citing In re
Schimmels, 127 F.3d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 1997); Schimmels, 127 F.3d at 884.
336. 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4475.1 (2d
ed., 2014).
337. Id.
338. Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50 (1974)); Mathews v. Denver
Newspaper Agency LLP, 649 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. Univ. of WisconsinMilwaukee, 783 F.2d 59, 62 (7th Cir. 1986)).
339. 18B WRIGHT, supra note 336, § 4475.1 (citing Cent. Transp., Inc. v. Four Phase Sys., Inc.,
936 F.2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1991)); Benjamin v. Traffic Executive Ass’n E. R.Rs., 869 F.2d 107,
115 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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Further complicating the issue, the Supreme Court has declined to
address whether a judgment in arbitration between individuals could have
preclusive effect on the Government. On the one occasion where the Court
had the opportunity to resolve the issue, the Court left “open” the question of
whether an “arbitration judgment would affect the validity of the
[Government’s] claim or the character of relief the [Government] may
seek.”340 In short, whether an adverse judgment in qui tam arbitration would
preclude the Government from relitigating is a matter of first impression for
the federal courts.
Developing a grand theory of preclusion is beyond the scope of this
article. Suffice to say, if a court were satisfied with an arbitration’s
procedures and opinion, the principles warranting preclusion broadly in qui
tam claims would also apply to the arbitration. Since the United States
retains its right to intervene, it can protect its interests in the suit and,
therefore, has effectively had its “day in court.” Qui tam arbitration could
therefore compel lower courts to do what no court has done before. It could
limit the Government’s right to relitigate actions based on an arbitration
clause signed only by private individuals.341
The DOJ appears to have been aware of this risk in Deck (the first
decision compelling qui tam arbitration). In a limited statement of interest
filed with the court, the DOJ argued that “any arbitration ruling as to such a
claim must necessarily be deemed a non-binding recommendation.”342 The
six-sentence statement failed to fully elaborate on the agency’s rationale.343
Nonetheless, the Government pointed to the text of the FCA and the fact that

340. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002).
341. Id.
342. Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., No. 3:12-cv-63, 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7 (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 31, 2013) (citing United States’ Limited Statement of Interest as to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss or Stay Action Pending Arbitration, No. 3:12-cv-63, 2012 WL 9385215 (S.D. Ohio Nov.
23, 2012)).
343. United States’ Limited Statement of Interest, 2012 WL 9385215.
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a qui tam claim “may not be settled without the consent of the Attorney
General.”344
The district court in Deck declined to resolve the preclusion question.345
Nonetheless, even if the court had reached the issue, the Government’s
statement of interest casts little light on whether the Government would be
precluded from relitigating an adverse judgment in arbitration. The
Government’s recitation of the FCA is correct: a claim may not be settled
without consent of the Attorney General; but this has little to do with
preclusion. An adverse judgment in arbitration is not a “settlement.” It is a
dismissal. And if a dismissal in arbitration has the same preclusive effect as
a judgment of a court, a judge would have to dismiss a subsequent claim
brought by the DOJ because the agency is a nonparty who is in privity with
the relator. Thus, the Attorney General’s veto power over settlements is
largely irrelevant to the question of whether the DOJ is in privity with
relators.346 As a result, the text of the FCA does not prevent the DOJ from
being bound by an adverse judgment against a relator in arbitration.
The Government could avoid preclusion on an alternative ground. As
previously noted, the lower courts have held that the Government is in
privity with relators because of the state’s statutory right to intervene and
control qui tam suits. Yet the FCA does not offer an explicit mechanism for
the Government to intervene in the arbitration. Since the Government has
no means to “present proofs and argument” in the arbitral hearings, the state
should not be bound by an adverse judgment arising from the proceedings.347
344. Id.
345. The district court in Deck posed its response solely as a hypothetical. “Even if mandatory
arbitration of the Plaintiffs’ FCA claim is not binding on the United States, arbitration is appropriate
given the substantive and procedural posture.” Deck, 2013 WL 394875, at *6-7.
346. Judges also do not need consent from the government prior to dismissing a qui tam claim.
United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 344 (6th Cir. 2000); U.S. ex rel.
Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1994); Minotti v. Lensink, 895 F.2d
100, 103 (2d Cir. 1990).
347. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 895 (2008) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 39 (1982)).
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This argument has persuasive value. Yet the constraints that arbitration
places on the DOJ are not so uncommon. The agency’s ability to control
relators is always limited. For example, the DOJ cannot unilaterally control
relators’ participation in court proceedings. Instead, the Government must
petition the court to limit the relator’s activities.348 The judge may then limit
a relator’s participation upon a showing by the DOJ that the relator “would
interfere with or unduly delay the Government’s prosecution of the case, or
would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment.”349
Furthermore, the DOJ still has several means to control the relator’s
arbitration. To begin, the agency could use the aforementioned provision of
the FCA. Since the relator’s claims in arbitration are likely identical to those
in the court proceedings, the DOJ would have a strong argument that the
relator’s “unrestricted participation during the course of the litigation” would
interfere with the agency’s prosecution.350 Since the FCA grants the court
broad discretion to “otherwise limit[] the participation by the [relator] in the
litigation,”351 this provision could reasonably be construed as authorizing the
court to stay the relator’s outside proceedings (including arbitration).
Additionally, some jurisdictions grant district courts statutory authority to
stay arbitration proceedings at the request of third parties.352 Thus, even if
the FCA lacks a means to stay a relator’s arbitration, state law may provide a
way. The DOJ therefore has several potential avenues by which to prevent
the arbitration from proceeding to judgment.
In sum, while any court determination on arbitration would be made on
a “case-by-case basis,” there is the chance that a judge would rule that
principles of preclusion bar the Government from relitigating an adverse
judgment in arbitration against a relator. Further, although the Supreme
348. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(C) (2012).
349. Id.
350. See id.
351. Id. § 3730(c)(C)(iv)(4).
352. Volt Info. Scis, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477
(1989) (enforcing stay of litigation at the request of a nonparty under California law).

265

Published by by
Published
Pepperdine
Pepperdine
Digital Digital
Commons,
Commons,
2015
2015

63
63

Pepperdine
Dispute
Resolution Law
Vol.Vol.
15, Iss.
[2015],
Art. 1 Art. 1
Pepperdine
Dispute
Resolution
LawJournal,
Journal,
15,2 Iss.
2 [2015],

[Vol. 15: 203, 2015]

Whistling in Silence
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

Court has once dodged the issue of arbitration’s effect on the Government, it
is unclear that the Court would do so again when considering fraud
allegations reaching into the billions of dollars. Until the Court decides the
issue, however, qui tam arbitration could pose a significant impediment to
the DOJ’s ability to enforce the FCA, should the agency not aggressively
exercise its right to intervene and limit relators’ participation in arbitrations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Qui tam arbitration raises fundamental questions about how far
arbitration should extend to statutory claims. This article demonstrates that
Congress left a significant loophole when it passed the Dodd-Frank
amendments in 2010. By failing to include anti-arbitration provisions in the
FCA, Congress set the groundwork for corporate defendants to force
whistleblower suits into the secretive forum of arbitration. Employers are
now building quickly. As the DOJ continues to push more qui tam suits into
the federal courts, the costs of defending such actions has incentivized
defendants to push for the cheaper, faster, and quieter avenue of arbitration.
As part of this strategy, companies have started adding “private attorney
general” actions to boilerplate arbitration clauses: a synonym for qui tam
suits. Corporations also are prevailing on their motions to compel, and are
creating precedent in favor of qui tam arbitration. As a result, corporate
defendants in the coming years are developing a regime to blunt the United
States’ primary weapon for recovering frauds against the Government. This
article demonstrates that it is time for Congress to respond—and to amend
the FCA to include the same prohibitions against arbitration as the nation’s
other whistleblower statutes.
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